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SOME POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS IN
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EARLY JACOBAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis is the establishment of early Jacobean foreign policy. Within the limitations of the available sources, an attempt will be made to show the flow of events from the Elizabethan era into the early Stuart period. Also an attempt will be made to show the extent to which James Stuart's personality resulted in traditional Tudor attitudes being adapted so that a new foreign policy evolved. This policy was reasonable and successful and it does not deserve the general condemnation levied by contemporaries and by subsequent historians.

The first chapter deals with the Elizabethan legacy, for it is only with a close look at this background that subsequent events can be understood. Chapter Two covers the establishment of peace during 1603 and 1604 and shows that the realization of peace, necessary for the well-being of England, was a natural continuation of events from the previous reign. The needs of the nation and the wishes of the new English king blended successfully. In the next few years, England enjoyed the fruits of this peace. Jacobean foreign relations in these early years of peace are dealt with in Chapter Three. The period under



discussion was marked by relative success in Jacobean foreign policy. Chapter Four outlines the more notable aspects and the principal influences on the policy. In part, it is concluded that James I's ability as a politician deserves more sympathetic attention than has hitherto been accorded to it.

Sir Robert Cecil played a leading role in Jacobean foreign policy. In May, 1603 he was created Baron Cecil of Essendon; in August, 1604, he became Viscount Cranborne; and in May, 1605 he became Earl of Salisbury. Throughout this paper he will be referred to as Sir Robert Cecil.

In the writing of this thesis a problem arose which must be mentioned. The calendar style of Europe had been undergoing a change and by the early seventeenth century most of Europe had adopted the new style of calendar. England did not and thus problems arise. In the following the old style is used in dates of the month while the new style is used for the year. According to the old style the official year began on March 24 but here it will be taken to start on January I. In direct quotations the author has retained the spellings and punctuation of his sources.



ABBREVIATIONS

- Cambridge 488.....St. John's College, Cambridge
Manuscript. Microfilm of the American
Council of Learned Societies, British
Manuscripts Project, Cambridge 488.
- Cal. S. P. Domestic.....Calendar of State Papers,
Domestic Series, of the Reign of
James I. (1603-1610).
- H. M. C. Hatfield.....Historical Manuscripts Commission.
Calendar of Hatfield House Manuscripts.
- S. P. 75.....State Papers Denmark.
- Cal. S. P. Venetian.....Calendar of State Papers and
Manuscripts relating to English Affairs,
existing in the Archives and Collections
of Venice, and in other Libraries of
Northern Italy.
- Winwood Memorials.....Memorials of Affairs of State in
the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King
James I collected chiefly from the
original papers of Sir Ralph Winwood.



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In the preparation and the writing of this thesis I am indebted to the encouragement and guidance of Dr. W. J. Jones.

INTRODUCTION

Early Jacobean foreign policy has, for the most part, been ignored by historians who have written on the period. Some students of foreign policy have found Elizabeth's reign to be full of romance and glory¹, whereas the second half of James's reign appeared remarkable for its weakness. However, this line of thought can be questioned. The subject of this thesis concerns the time between these two eras and illustrates the flow of events in foreign policy from the Elizabethan to the Jacobean period.

Very little has been said about foreign policy in the early years of James's reign except as an illustration of financial difficulties. Several historians have been concerned with the weaknesses and failings of James's later years on the English throne, and they have imposed their conclusions on to the whole Jacobean period. Godfrey Davies in The Early Stuarts devoted little space to the

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1. A more detached view of Elizabethan foreign policy is, however, provided by R. B. Wernham, "Elizabethan War Aims and Strategy", Elizabethan Government and Society: Essays presented to Sir John Neale, ed. S. T. Bindoff, J. Hurstfield, and C. H. Williams (London, 1961), p. 341.

subject of Jacobean foreign affairs. He made a few general comments but seemed content to suggest that English foreign relations during James's reign were not important in themselves, except as an influence on the domestic scene.¹

D. H. Willson in his important biography of James I spent a little time on early Jacobean foreign affairs, but he also tended to ascribe the weakness of the later years to the whole reign.²

Other works of a more specific nature have been concerned with aspects of early Jacobean foreign affairs, but have not dealt with the subject as a topic in itself. A. J. Loomie, in dealing with the religious issue in Anglo-Spanish relations during the first two years of the Jacobean period, has thrown some light on the conduct of foreign affairs, but is mainly concerned with the existence of the so-called Catholic party in England.³ In his study of the secret diplomacy of the Habsburgs during the Jacobean era, C. H. Carter has presented a fair-minded

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1. Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660, (2nd. ed., Oxford, 1959), p. 47.
 2. D. H. Willson, King James VI & I, (London, 1963).
 3. A. J. Loomie, "Toleration and Diplomacy - the Religious Issue in Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1603-1605", Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, LIII, Part VI, (September, 1963).



sketch of James I, but devoted little space to the king's foreign policy.¹ Carter's book is valuable as a study of the diplomatic processes of the age. In the field of foreign affairs a valuable study is A. MacFadyen's thesis, "Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1603-1625".² MacFadyen was able to use original Spanish materials but the bulk of his treatment deals with the later years of James and especially focuses on Count Gondomar.

Studies in Jacobean foreign policy have been generally relegated to a secondary position under other Jacobean topics. Part of the reason for this is that the sources available are incomplete. The Calendars of State Papers Domestic, for example, are of little use in the study of foreign affairs. This is also true of the Calendar of Hatfield House Manuscripts. The principal source, the State Papers Foreign at the Public Record Office, have not been organized to meet the requirements of modern research or provided with printed calendars. Therefore problems do exist in studying Jacobean foreign policy.

There are grounds for suspicion that the policies

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1. C. H. Carter, The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625, (New York, 1964), pp. 109-119.
 2. A. MacFadyen, "Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1603-1625" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Liverpool, 1960).

of James's early years in England were a natural evolution from Elizabeth's reign. The peace negotiations and the diplomacy of 1603-1604 actually were conducted on the English side in accordance with the tradition of Elizabethan diplomatic practice. During his early years as King of England, James was guided by such Elizabethan statesmen as Sir Robert Cecil, who had become First Secretary in 1596, and this guidance provided continuity in the field of foreign affairs. But before anything further is said, it must be remembered that foreign policy constituted perhaps the most incontrovertible of all the royal prerogatives. Nevertheless, there were several problems inherent for James. For example, the new king was a foreigner and could not be expected to have a good appreciation of the aims and needs of his new realm. Nor was he ever really to gain this knowledge, although various statesmen, including Francis Bacon, tried to help him. Certainly, when Cecil's guiding hand was removed by death, there was no longer anyone who could effectively advise him.

In relations with other states, James's early years in England produced a successful adjustment. Because England had for so long lived in a state of war, her friends and enemies of the past greeted James with definite proposals and requests. The Dutch and French hoped that



James would keep England at war with Spain. On their part, the Spanish were ready to negotiate for the end of the long war. All these interested parties gathered in London from May, 1603 to August, 1604, and were joined by various missions from other areas of Europe who were interested in congratulating James on his accession. The conglomeration of embassies and missions in London represented a circus in which each individual performer concerned himself with his reason for being there. The relations between England and other states formulated during this time remained the basis of early Jacobean foreign affairs. James was successful in gaining the apparent friendship of all those who petitioned him for aid. He was the instrument that effected the Spanish peace, and whether this was popular with his subjects or not could not hide the English need for peace. Many things had to be taken into consideration, but English war-weariness in 1603 was obvious.

Certainly there are religious issues involved in all aspects of Jacobean history, but in this thesis they will not be dealt with at length. This does not mean that religion did not play a part in the establishment of early Jacobean foreign policy. But religion has usually been taken as the focal point for any discussion of the early seventeenth century, so much so that other issues have been relegated to an inferior position. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine some of the political and economic aspects of the establishment of Jacobean foreign policy.

In this way it will be shown that even though religious issues were always present, an understanding of the development of foreign policy can be achieved through a study of other considerations.

Certain factors came to the fore, as James's reign progressed, which played an integral part in the formulation of foreign policy. For example, James was often guided by financial considerations. When the evidence is examined and the facts introduced, it will appear that a policy existed and was reasonable in the early Jacobean context. An appreciation of this allows a more sympathetic picture of the much criticized James Stuart to emerge.



CHAPTER I

THE ELIZABETHAN LEGACY

War with Spain dominated the last years of the reign of Elizabeth Tudor. The Elizabethan era would soon seem glorious for those who looked back on it, but for those who lived within its immediate shadow, the sense of glory was more remote. The failure of the Spanish Armada was viewed with proud excitement by the English, but this excitement disappeared in the following years. Even the great queen was to find her last years more trying and less rewarding, because she was surrounded with unsolvable problems and had little room in which to manoeuvre. The legacy of greatness she left was itself a seed of peril to her successor. In fact, many regard the Elizabethan war years as a period of recession.¹


The real effects of war were only to be felt gradually, because the Spanish Armada came at the beginning of the war and not the end. The necessity of protecting her realm from the foremost Christian power of the age caused Elizabeth to overtax not only her own resources, but those of her subjects. As the 1590's progressed, Spanish naval

1. S. T. Bindoff, Tudor England, (London, 1950), pp. 277-307



power increased and Spanish defences of their once vulnerable supply-line to the New World improved.¹ While Spain learned to defend her vast possessions, England ventured farther afield in the search of a suitable line of defence. England found it necessary to support the United Provinces and France. At the same time, frantic measures like the defence of her coast and operations in Ireland added to the deluge of war costs. In addition, her international trade was dealt a serious blow, not only by the closed Spanish markets but also by increased privateering which led to the disruption of regular trade. The privateers of the late Elizabethan period followed the pace set by Drake and his "fellow gangsters" and proved to be a curse on the economic life of the age.² It has been stated that there was a long-term advantage for English commercial development in the Spanish war, but in the eyes of contemporaries the obvious effect was a farther depression in the cloth export trade.³ The odd successful voyage to the Indies could not make up for the loss of the cloth markets in the Spanish dominions. In addition,

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1. J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716, (New York, 1964), p. 283.
 2. Bindoff, Tudor England, p. 286.
 3. K. R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, (Cambridge, 1964), p. 527.



during the last years of Elizabeth's reign, the English suffered crop failures and visitations of the plague.

Supple summed up the situation: "...the mundane realities of trading conditions, cloth exports, plague, famine and unemployment are better indications of the economic history of the last of the Tudors than the romance of the Spanish Main..."¹ While trade decreased, royal demands for men and money grew until by the end of the reign little of either was to be found. The Crown once again began to sell its lands as it found that taxation, which was on a high scale, far from popular and anyhow incapable of tapping the wealth of the country, was totally inadequate.² The Spanish war was the main cause of these economic difficulties.

Since her accession, Elizabeth had been confronted with problems in foreign affairs. These problems revolved around France and Spain, which were the principal actors on the stage of Elizabethan foreign policy. Both were much stronger than England and were regarded with caution by her. England would only be left in relative safety if France

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1. B. E. Supple, Commercial Crises and Change in England, 1600-42, (Cambridge, 1959), p. 23.
 2. Bindoff, Tudor England, p. 284.

and Spain were preoccupied with one another in their struggle for European domination. This was a precarious balance and when Elizabeth ascended the throne it seemed to the English that France was the stronger power. However, by 1567 Spain appeared to be the enemy par excellence, for it was in that year that Spain found it necessary to fortify her troops in the Netherlands.¹ The English watched this with aroused interest. The Duke of Alva arrived in the Spanish-controlled Netherlands and was soon in command of 25,000 troops. This build-up of power was deemed necessary by Philip II of Spain because of growing domestic problems in the Netherlands. Unrest had grown there for several years before it culminated in the capture of Brill and Flushing by the Sea Beggars in 1572.² As the revolt rapidly took on serious proportions, other towns followed these first two into the camp of William of Orange.

Elizabeth saw the expanded Spanish might in the Netherlands as a potential threat. Matters were complicated farther by a renewed French interest in the Netherlands. Elizabeth saw this interest as a possible beginning of

1. Wernham, "Elizabethan War Aims", p. 341.

2. For the best work in English on the revolt, see: P. Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609, (London, 1932).


French interference in the Dutch revolt. This caused her to be wary. Although Elizabeth had little sympathy with rebels,¹ and in this she was not unlike James I, her fear of a Spanish attack from the Netherlands was combined with her fear that the French might become Dutch protectors and perhaps annex them. These anxieties gradually forced Elizabeth to give open support to the rebels.

Elizabeth's fear of the French threat was premature, for France once again was reduced by domestic strife. The year 1584 had witnessed the death of the Duke of Alençon, one-time suitor of the English queen, leaving the Protestant Henry of Navarre heir-presumptive to the childless Henry III. The House of Guise formed a Spanish-backed party in order to prevent a Protestant from attaining the French crown. As a result, Elizabeth was forced to act against Spain for she could not afford to see the Dutch and Huguenots destroyed and France fall under Guise dominance.²

By 1585, it seemed that Spain was on the verge of crushing the rebels, and Elizabeth now had to act unless

1. J. E. Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, (London, 1958; First published in 1934), p. 235.

2. Wernham, "Elizabethan War Aims", p. 345.



she was willing to see Spanish power re-established across the Channel. England, as champion of the Dutch cause, had played an important part in the revolt. English volunteers had been in the Netherlands since 1572, and after 1585 there were never fewer than 6,000 English troops stationed there.¹ In that year Elizabeth had given open assistance to the Dutch when she undertook to maintain 1,000 horse and 5,000 foot in their service. At this time it was agreed that England would be given possession of Flushing, Brill, and the fort of Rammekens as security for the money which Elizabeth loaned the Dutch. These became known as the cautionary towns. Also, England was given the right to have two members on the Dutch Council in the persons of her chief military commander and her diplomatic representative. Although this ostensibly gave the English an important voice in Dutch affairs, in actuality the powers of the Council of State were gradually taken away, leaving only matters such as military administration in its hands.² The States-General took over the powers but English in-

1. Bindoff, Tudor England, p. 227.

2. G. N. Clark and W. J. M. Van Eysinga, The Colonial Conferences Between England and the Netherlands in 1613 and 1615, ("Bibliotheca Visseriana Dissertationum ius Internationale Illustrantium", Vol. XVII, Pt. II, Batavorum, 1959), p. 2.

fluence was ever present.

Of course, there were also other causes of the Anglo-Spanish quarrel. Trade disputes, English intrusion in the New World, English privateering, and religious differences all formed a part of this quarrel.¹ Yet the main reason was the English fear of Spanish power being reaffirmed and strengthened in the Netherlands. However, it should be added that Elizabeth had no desire to see Spain lose her dominions there. Wernham has summed up the matter: "...a restored France that was not matched by a powerful Spain would be, if possible, a worse danger to England than a triumphant Spain that was not matched by a strong France."² Here is the crux of the matter and the basic tenet of Elizabethan foreign policy.

As the Spanish war progressed, English wariness of Guise dominance in France caused Elizabeth to support Henry IV with men and money. A series of English loans began in 1587 and ultimately amounted to over £400,000 by the end of Elizabeth's reign.³ These loans were of great assistance to Henry who, for his part, unified France under

1. Wernham, "Elizabethan War Aims", p, 344.

2. Ibid., p. 345.

3. F. C. Dietz, English Public Finance, 1485-1641, (New York, 1964), II, pp. 458-59.



his leadership by his conversion to Catholicism and by suppressing the powerful house of Guise. Once Henry's position was secure he dealt with Spain. But the long domestic upheaval left France weary. For this reason Henry made peace with Spain in 1598, much to the chargin of Elizabeth, and began to rebuild his kingdom.

England also showed signs of war-weariness. When a country is at war the general question of the possibility of peace is always present. This was especially true in the latter years of Elizabeth's reign when peace was often in the foreground and always in the background. But not everyone was interested in peace and there were groups, like the successful privateers, who benefitted from the war and therefore did not support peace. Fortunately, these interests were not dominant and as the sixteenth century drew to a close the majority of Englishmen and the Crown itself hoped for a settlement.

Indications of the country's war-weariness appeared in parliamentary speeches as early as 1593.¹ Even so, this was an isolated reaction and the war was pursued with gusto for several more years. It was during this period that the Cecil's, both father and son, seemed to be among those

1. Dietz, English Public Finance, p. 53.



who hoped for an end to the war. But the war party was still too powerful. As Lord Treasurer, the elder Cecil, Lord Burghley, was occupied trying to pay for the war and it was only in the twilight months of his life that he thought seriously of peace.¹ He favoured peace but not peace at any price.

Burghley was aware of the many difficulties which would come with any English attempt to make peace, not least of which was the danger of losing the money loaned to France and the United Provinces.² Apparently, the creditor was so involved that she could not get out unless she was assured that the money would be repaid.³ From year to year money was becoming scarce in the English Exchequer and for this reason it is no wonder that when Burghley died in 1589 he left his son, who was to become Lord Treasurer five years after James's accession, a legacy of a desire for peace. He knew that settlement of the war was necessary because of the tremendous demands on crown finances, but peace would only be realized if English

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1. Conyers Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth, (New York, 1960), pp. 542-44.
 2. Throughout this thesis the independent Dutch state will be called the United Provinces.
 3. Dietz, English Public Finance, p. 53.

interests were protected. Robert Cecil remembered his father's advice and could have been the inspiration for the Council when it advised the new King to support the Dutch, even indirectly, because of the money the United Provinces owed England.¹


Because Burghley and such members of the Privy Council as Buckhurst, Howard and Robert Cecil had been openly advocating peace during the 1590's, it became obvious that there was a strong desire for peace among some of Elizabeth's leading councillors. It must have appeared so to Henry IV when he made his peace with Spain in 1598. From the correspondence with Sir Henry Neville² and Cecil from 1599 to 1600, it was clear that Henry IV and his ministers were concerned over what they felt to be England's desire for peace.³ Neville reported that the French court feared the consequences of an Anglo-Spanish peace since Spain would be free to apply pressure on France, especially in her problems with Savoy.⁴ Here it appeared

1. H. M. C. Hatfield, XV, p. 39 (The Lords of the Council to James).

2. Neville was sent to Paris as resident English ambassador in May, 1599. He led the English delegation at Boulogne in 1600 and returned to England, because of ill health, after the failure of the Boulogne Conference. His career was ended until James's accession because of his involvement in Essex's rebellion.

3. Winwood Memorials, I, p. 34 (Neville to Cecil).

4. Ibid., I, p. 34 (Neville to Cecil).



that Henry IV saw England as a useful counterweight to Spain, an idea hardly acceptable to Elizabeth. The King of France was trying his best to keep the other powers pre-occupied while he settled his own problems. It was even hinted that he worked behind Elizabeth's back and attempted to turn the Dutch against Elizabeth and closer to his influence.¹ Neville's mission was without success in that he failed to get Henry IV to repay the money Elizabeth had loaned him. It could hardly be expected that the French king would settle his debt with a power which was leaning more and more to peace with his arch-enemy. Neville explained the situation in France to Cecil in April, 1600:

And though you should both intend and see likelyhood to conclude a Peace with Spaine, I see not why it should not be good for the Queene to differre it soe long, till she might both assure her Marchants State and Trade here, and drawe hence peradventure fifty or threescore thousand Pound: whereof the Peace being once made, she is in daunger never to see a Penny. They will not offer to binde you not to make Peace with Spaine, but only seeke to assure themselves, that you will not make Alliance with Spaine against them, which is the thing they extremely feare, and whereof in my poore Opinion they would be held in doubt, till you drawe satisfaction from them.²

The case for peace was enhanced in 1600 when

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1. Winwood Memorials, I, p. 107 (Neville to Cecil).
 2. Ibid., I, p. 169 (Neville to Cecil).



Elizabeth decided to send a delegation to Boulogne to discuss treaty terms with the representatives of the King of Spain and the Archdukes. Although the various delegations were present at Boulogne from May to July, arguments over procedure prevented them from officially coming together. The Spanish would not meet with the English unless they were given diplomatic precedence. Also, they demanded that negotiations should take place at their residence but the English would participate only if a neutral meeting-place were found. Elizabeth was prepared to bow to Spanish precedence only if the Spanish would continue negotiations at an English coastal town. This was hardly acceptable to the Spanish, and Elizabeth probably knew this. The problem was not resolved, and the delegations dispersed without any progress being made.¹ It would appear that the Spanish over-played their insistence on precedence because they misjudged Elizabeth's need for peace.² Also, the Spanish delegates did not seem to be properly empowered to negotiate an acceptable peace. This may have explained the impossible protocol demands. But the important fact

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1. It should be noted that in 1604, when the Spanish were negotiating in London, they did so in Somerset House, the official residence of the Spanish ambassador.
 2. Winwood Memorials, I, p. 257 (Winwood to Neville).



remains that the first steps towards peace were taken and there was progress in that some of the problems which would face any future peace discussion were brought into the open. Elizabeth knew that peace could not suddenly be realized and intimated this when she instructed her commissioners¹ at Boulogne to inform the Spanish that if a truce was called during negotiations, she could only promise a truce in the Narrow Seas and the Archdukes' dominions because ships at sea could not readily be informed of a truce.² Also, a sudden cessation of hostilities was impossible because too many interests derived profit from the war and they could not suddenly be challenged. But at least the Boulogne effort showed Elizabeth to be willing to consider some sort of practical truce. However, the opportunity was lost and the war grew hotter, especially in Ireland.

Ireland had been a thorn in England's side for many generations and this was especially evident in 1598 when the rebel Earl of Tyrone made serious advances on English authority. Tyrone's successes were due to his ability to organize the Irish into an effective military force.³

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1. Sir Henry Neville, Thomas Edmonds, John Herbert, and Robert Beale.
 2. Winwood Memorials, I, p. 198 (Elizabeth to Commissioners).
 3. Cyril Falls, Mountjoy: Elizabethan General, (London, 1955), pp. 100-102.



The crisis came in the autumn of 1601 when a Spanish army arrived to support Tyrone. Only the energy of Lord Deputy Mountjoy and his able Lieutenant, Sir George Carew,¹ reaffirmed English authority and removed the Spanish danger.

As an Anglo-Spanish peace loomed on the horizon it seemed that the basic English distrust of France increased. According to Ralph Winwood,² the King of France was pleased with the Boulogne failure and even assured the Dutch that an Anglo-Spanish peace was as distant as ever.³ This must have annoyed Elizabeth. This distrust was fortified by Winwood's reports from Paris. In April, 1601, he declared: "...there is no Foundation to be made upon the Amitie of this Nation, especially on the Terms we now stand with them..."⁴ Henry IV was doing everything he could to keep England at war, but his ability to do so was handicapped


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1. Carew began service in Ireland in 1574. In January 1600 he became president of Munster but retired from this position in March 1603. He found favour under James and was elevated to the peerage in 1604. In February 1626 he became Earl of Totnes.
 2. In 1599 Winwood was nominated as Neville's secretary and after the latter was dismissed in 1601, he was named resident English ambassador and remained at this post until he was relieved by Parry in 1602. Winwood became English ambassador at the Hague in 1603 and remained in that post until 1614. In 1614 he became Secretary of State.
 3. Winwood Memorials, I, p. 314 (Winwood to Cecil).
 4. Ibid., I, p. 315 (Winwood to Cecil).



after Essex's declining influence and subsequent fall. Essex had been the most prominent exponent of continued hostilities and with his fall there was no longer anyone able to prod England along in the war game.

During the last months of Elizabeth's reign there was again an indication, in England and abroad, of an interest in peace. The most serious and constant peace overtures came from the Archdukes, who realized the exhausting demands of war. Their rule had begun in 1598 when Philip II of Spain signed his Burgundian holdings, known as the Spanish Netherlands, over to his daughter Isabella in anticipation of her marriage to the Archduke Albert of Austria. Hereafter, Isabella and Albert were known jointly as the Archdukes. Once the Archdukes settled in their new capital they were aware of the need for peace. Sir Robert Cecil, Elizabeth's leading councillor, noted in November, 1602 that they were constantly voicing their desire to see an end to the state of war in which they were floundering.¹ But their declarations were vague and the English had to be wary lest they appear too credulous in the matter. Thomas Edmonds, who had been a delegate at Boulogne and who was a supporter of the Cecils, presented this warning

1. H. M. C. Hatfield, XIV, p. 237.



in a memorandum in March, 1602.¹ Such notes of caution were plentiful but they could not seriously disrupt the trend towards a solution. However, the Dutch were quick to lament any English peace gestures, and their strong arguments combined with the deep involvement and investment of the English, gave them an added advantage. They openly admitted that they were not ready for peace because their fortunes were generally on the rise.² Nevertheless, England had to think of her own position.

Although the Archdukes seemed eager for peace it was not evident that the King of Spain shared their feelings. Philip III ascended the throne in 1598 and had to be convinced that Spanish fortunes would not improve if the war was continued. Practical examples of Spanish misfortune, like the failure of the Irish expedition in 1601, gradually brought him 'round to work for peace, a desire which was probably in his father's mind before his death.³ Actually, this changed attitude was the result of many factors not least of which were financial. In 1596 when financial failures caused Philip II to cancel his debts it was evident that

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1. H. M. C. Hatfield, XII, p. 87. Edmonds was English resident ambassador in Brussels from 1605 to 1609, and then in Paris after 1610.
 2. Ibid, XII, p. 476.
 3. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 285

there was little hope for the future of Crown finances if Spain remained at war.¹ Other factors like the disruption of trade, the intrusion of other Europeans in the New World, the economic decay on the domestic scene, and other related conditions, all pointed to the need for Spain to end her wars and to attempt to recoup her strength. From the beginning of his reign, Philip III was faced with the harsh realities of an empty treasury and an exhausted nation.² It is no wonder that by the beginning of 1603 Spain was seriously contemplating new peace negotiations.

One final point, when considering war and peace at this time, one must be aware of the thin line which separated the two.³ This was especially true at sea where even in times of peace letters of reprisal gave each ship a threatening appearance. This possibly explains why the English war profiteers were ready to accept peace, a peace which they could interpret in such a way that would not hinder their activities. In this way adventurous individuals could find an outlet for their energies.

As far as the supporters of the war were concerned, another threat loomed on the horizon in the person of James Stuart. The little that was known about the King of Scotland

1. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 281

2. Ibid., p. 285.

3. For a complete discussion see: Sir George Clark, War and Society in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, England, 1958)



was that he was a lover of peace and quiet. In one of his more scholarly works, the Basilikon Doron, James set down his basic desire to live in peace with all of Christendom. It could be assumed that this man could be counted on to strive for peace once he became King of England. The rapidity with which the French and the Dutch sent their delegations to the new king in their attempt to discourage peace illustrated this. But the task of the French and Dutch was made difficult by the fact that James, apart from being thought of as a man of peace, actually was an unknown quantity, not only in Europe but in England as well. James Stuart was a foreigner who acceded to a throne about which he knew little or nothing, and his Danish wife, Queen Anne, could offer little assistance for she knew even less about England. James had never been in England before his accession and was not properly prepared to take over a new and completely strange government.

Fortunately, he had a man of Sir Robert Cecil's calibre to introduce and guide him along in his new position. Cecil had been moulded by his father to take over from him as the Crown's principal servant.¹ Once Cecil had established himself as Elizabeth's leading councillor he proceeded to correspond secretly with the King

1. G. M. Trevelyan, England Under the Stuarts, (London, 1960), p. 280.



of Scotland in order to guide him in his relations with Elizabeth.¹ James was recognized as having a strong claim to the English throne since there was no obvious successor to the childless Elizabeth. Of the many claims presented, James's was the best, even though the Stuart line had been excluded from Henry VIII's last will.² There was much behind-the-scenes debate over Elizabeth's successor, and this dominated the last years of her reign. With the beginning of the correspondence of Cecil and James in 1601, there could be little doubt that the Stuart line would succeed the Tudor in orderly fashion. Once Cecil emerged victorious from his struggle with the Earl of Essex, he dispelled, in secret correspondence with James, past rumours that he favoured the Infanta's claim to the throne.³ He then advised his future master. Cecil laid the ground-work for the accession of James and as a result it proceeded smoothly.

James came to England as the most successful ruler Scotland had known for many generations. He had been king

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1. J. Hurstfield, "The Succession Struggle in Late Elizabethan England", Elizabethan Government and Society: essays presented to Sir John Neale, ed. S. T. Bindoff, J. Hurstfield, and C. H. Williams (London, 1961), p. 391.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

for thirty-six of his thirty-seven years. However, this experience had usually been unpleasant as the Scottish throne was beset with innumerable problems. These James managed to live with or overcome, but he never forgot his past insecure and rather squalid existence in Scotland, where he could not even afford an armed guard.¹ When he was not quarrelling with his advisors, his over-mighty subjects, or the domineering character of the Kirk, he was expending every energy to gain the English Crown.² This was the cornerstone of his foreign policy. He presented his case to both Protestant and Catholic countries, making promises and half-promises in order to gain acceptance. He strove to make his person and claim attractive to all.


James's personality was not impressive. He has been described as "...spindle-shanked, google-eyed, and sloppy-mouthed..."³ Such a description could have been an exaggerated portrait of the king in his later years, but hardly is valid for his younger years. James did not seem unattractive to his new subjects who greeted him in 1603. According to G. M. Trevelyan:

The man on whom the English thus first set eyes was by no means contemptible in person, in spite

1. Willson, King James VI & I, p. 23.

2. J. M. Mackie, A History of Scotland, (London, 1964), p. 179.

3. Ibid.



of grossly coarse manners. In the prime of life, over middle height, a good horseman, devoted to the chase, drinking hugely but never overcome by his liquor; he employed a pithy wit and a wealth of homely images and learned conceits in free and familiar discourse with all. Nor during the progress did he dispel the prejudice in his favour.¹

His learning was extensive as he had had a vigorous and severe classical education. He was conversant in several languages and one of the best-read men of his age. But he also had an exaggerated opinion of his own worth and of kingship, and this was encouraged by the reception accorded him. All the great English Lords addressed him with humility and some, like Lord Henry Howard, descended to fawning and grovelling.² James enjoyed this and therefore all those who craved attention followed Howard's lead. This included the clergy who "...cast a halo of holiness about him and discovered his celestial proximity to the Deity."³

James's religious position was complicated. He was exposed to a strong Protestant upbringing but he also acquired some understanding of Catholicism. Actually he was interested in theology for its own sake. Throughout

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1. Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts, p. 70.
 2. Willson, King James VI & I, p. 168.
 3. Ibid., p. 120.

his Scottish reign he was constantly exposed to the Catholic nobility, some of whom were personal favourites. He was relatively tolerant in an intolerant age and never willingly persecuted Catholics for their beliefs.¹ James used this openmindedness to advantage in building up his claim to the English throne and even sought support from Rome. He solicited Catholic support with the promise of leniency for the English Catholics. But once he had attained his goal in 1603, James found that his toleration, whether sincere or not, had to be closely guarded. This disappointed many Englishmen, especially the Catholics, and they attempted to obtain concessions from him. In this they were unsuccessful because the king found the existing English religious settlement and the Anglican church to his liking. Nevertheless, it should again be pointed out that, personally, James was not bigoted and this enabled him to associate freely in later years with all Christian states.

And so James Stuart came to the throne of England. Since England was weary of the long struggle which had enveloped her for two decades, it could be expected that foreign policy would come under review. Furthermore, the

1. Mackie, A History of Scotland, p. 183.



international scene had changed, for with the gradual revival of French power England no longer had to fear Spanish predominance in Western Europe. Also, Spain joined England in her war-weariness and needed peace to reorganize her power. While these two sought a respite to the war, the Dutch did not, for they felt that they could secure their position only by continuing the fight. The Dutch lamented the English tendency to seek peace and cried out that they were being betrayed. It was in this atmosphere that Jacobean diplomacy originated. It was not a question of war or peace, but upon what terms peace could be realized.



CHAPTER II

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

In the spring of 1603 as James Stuart journeyed toward his new capital, the attention of Europe was drawn toward London. Several European countries prepared to send diplomatic embassies to greet the new king. The atmosphere was tense and expectant. This could be expected because of the changes in the European diplomatic^{scene} now that the two great antagonists of the past two decades, Elizabeth I and Philip II were dead. Spain had carried on the struggle under Philip III but the course England would follow under her new monarch remained to be seen.

The very fact of James's accession had already made a change in that he was personally at peace with Spain.¹ The Archdukes quickly took advantage of the new situation in England. In mid-April, 1603, Marin Cavalli reported that the Archdukes had given orders that English shipping must not be molested.² He confirmed this report in May

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1. G. N. Clark carries this even farther by declaring that according to the accepted law of time, James's accession terminated the state of war between England and Spain. See Clark, The Colonial Conferences, p. 5.
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 14 (Cavalli to Doge and Senate). Cavalli was Venetian ambassador in France at James's accession and remained there until June, 1603, when he was replaced by Angelo Badoer.

adding that the English had also been admitted to trade in Flanders. Thus the Archdukes wasted no time in showing James that they hoped to live in harmony with him. This desire seemed to emanate from Spain as well. At the same time that Cavalli wrote about the first gesture of the Archdukes, his counterpart in Spain, Simon Contarini reported that the Spanish were ready to do all they could to establish good relations with England.¹ In fact, they cancelled a proposed plan for a new Irish expedition. Another example of this new Spanish amity was shown in May when Philip III ordered Spanish vessels to stop molesting English shipping. James also moved in this direction. On June 22 he issued a proclamation declaring that all prizes taken after April 24 must be returned, and recalled the commissions granted by Elizabeth which allowed warlike ships to take Spanish vessels as prizes.² Thus, both sides were making peaceful gestures.

To the people of the United Provinces who had been struggling for independence, any change in the policy of their sponsor and protector, Elizabethan England, was of

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1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 14 (Contarini to Doge and Senate).
 2. Thomas Rymer (comp.), Foedera (18 vols., London, 1704-26), XVI, p. 516.



the greatest importance. The Dutch were naturally anxious over what to expect from the new king and proclaimed the fact that they were not strong enough to stand up to Spain alone. However, they either underestimated their own position or overestimated English support because by 1603 they were firmly entrenched behind an impregnable line of defense. But despite the fact that James was expected to work for peace, the English nation was not prepared to abandon the Dutch completely. The two countries had a long tradition of close association and the Dutch and English had been allied against Spain for many years. Besides, they had close economic ties and both were leaders of the Protestant cause. James was not unaware of past Anglo-Dutch friendship, and this prevented him from acting too rashly. As King of Scotland, James had been on good terms with the Dutch, although he had few political dealings with them.¹ From Scotland, Thomas Lake² reported to Sir Robert Cecil on April 4, 1603, that James had stated that he would not abandon the Dutch, but Lake was not certain of the king's sincerity.³ It is probable that

1. Clark, The Colonial Conferences, p. 57.

2. Three days after the death of Elizabeth, Lake and Sir George Carew were sent by the Council to James to acquaint him with the state of affairs in England.

3. H. M. C. Hatfield, XV, p. 30.



Lake was aware of James's Basilikon Doron, written in 1598, in which James spoke out against those who rebel against their lawful rulers. At the same time the Lords of the Council were quick to offer sound practical advice. They wrote to James on April 8 stating that they would allow the Dutch to continue their recruiting aimed at building up the English regiments under their command, because it was approved and begun under Elizabeth.¹ They pointed out that England had great interest in the Dutch and must continue her support of them. The troops referred to passed over to Flushing.²

Although James as King of England had to support the Dutch, personally he regarded them as mere rebels. This was reported throughout May, 1603 by Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, the Venetian ambassador in London. This could have been one of the reasons why the Dutch were so quick to send a delegation to the new king. The Dutch delegation arrived in London on May 14, 1603, one week after James had appeared for the first time at his new capital, but they were not to gain an audience with the king until the end of June. The delegation

1. H. M. C. Hatfield, XV, p. 39.

2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 5 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).



was led by Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Pensionary of Holland and one of his country's most capable men.¹ Although Cavalli asserted that the Dutch believed that James would not completely abandon Elizabeth's policy, the delegation was sceptical as to what to expect from the new English king. They were soon annoyed because James was evasive with regard to his future plans and because he had indicated that he was willing to act as arbiter between them and the Spanish. The Dutch also felt that James was acting in an unfriendly way and even suspected that he wanted them to make him an offer of the Protectorate of the United Provinces.² This hardly seems likely, for James came to understand the necessity of not forsaking the Dutch cause completely. By the beginning of July, 1603, Scaramelli was reporting that James would never desert the Dutch if their position became untenable. Any vacillation on the part of James must be attributed to the fact that he was just beginning to familiarize himself with his new obligations.

Oldenbarnevelt tried to achieve some sort of

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1. J. L. Motley, John of Barneveld (2 Vols., New York 1876). Motley gives an interesting, although eulogistic account of Oldenbarnevelt.
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 41 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).



success for his mission but by the beginning of June had only succeeded in gaining James's disfavour. According to Scaramelli, one reason for this was the lavish Dutch spending in London which James found vexatious in light of the fact that the Dutch were seeking financial assistance. The Dutch delegation itself complained to the States-General that the high spending which was necessary at the English court was getting them nowhere.¹ Another reason for James's disfavour was the fact that the Dutch kept the Flemish ambassador from crossing the Channel by blockading the Flemish ports.² Nevertheless, it appeared that the English were delaying an official meeting with Dutch delegations until other quarters were heard from, and while James and England were becoming better acquainted.

It was at the end of June that Oldenbarnevelt managed, through irregular channels, to gain an audience with James. With Scottish assistance, probably obtained because of Dutch gifts,³ Oldenbarnevelt was allowed to meet James 'accidentally'. James must have warmed to the Dutch problem by this time as he had favourably welcomed

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1. A. J. Veenendaal, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Bescheiden Betreffende Zijn Staat-Kundig Beleid en Aijn Familie, Tweede Doele, 1602-1613 ("Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien", Grote Serie 108; S-Gravenhaee, Verkrijgbaar: 1962), p. 48 (Ambassadors to States General).
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 47 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).
 3. Ibid., p. 35 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).



the French delegation earlier in the month and was exposed to its support of the Dutch interest, especially with regard to succour for Ostend which had been the primary aim of the Dutch delegation since its arrival. After the arrival of the French the Venetian ambassador reported that James was more responsive to the fact of Anglo-Dutch mutual needs. For their part the Dutch gained more confidence with the French support, and were unwilling to listen to any peace proposals because aid could probably be obtained from one quarter or another.¹ In other words they were using French sympathy to discourage English abandonment of the Dutch cause. Their requests were met in so far as they were allowed to continue recruiting troops in England and Scotland. They proceeded to do so during the summer of 1603.

France was intensely concerned over whether as King of England James would continue to defy the power of Spain. This was shown when Henry IV selected Maximilien de Béthune, Marquis de Rosny and later Duc de Sully, as extraordinary ambassador to England. Rosny was one of Henry's most capable ministers and was sent to England

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 62 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).



despite the opposition to Henry's sending one heretic (Rosny was a Huguenot) to greet another heretic.¹ On the other hand perhaps the fact that Rosny was a Huguenot gave him an advantage in dealing with James.² It was evident that the French needed all the help they could get to persuade James to keep England at war with Spain and continue her flow of assistance to the Dutch. Since James's arrival the resident French ambassador in London, Christophe de Harlay, Comte de Beaumont, had been reporting that the new king was bent on peace.³ Beaumont did his best to point out all the disadvantages of a Spanish peace but he had little success. His position was made difficult because James personally disliked him as a result of Beaumont's supposed support of Arabella Stuart as Elizabeth's successor.⁴ James even went as far as to request the Frenchman's removal. Nevertheless, relations between the two were patched up within a few months and Beaumont could carry out his duties more effectively.

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1. Memoires de Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de Sully (10 Vols., Londres, 1778), IV, pp. 238-39.
 2. Cal S. P. Venetian, X, p. 8 (Cavalli to Doge and Senate).
 3. Laffleur de Kermaingant, L'Ambassade de France en Angleterre sous Henri IV Mission de Christophe de Harlay, Comte de Beaumont (2 Vols., Paris, 1895), I, p. 108.
 4. Cal.S. P. Venetian, X, p. 38 (Cavalli to Doge and Senate).



Beaumont worked diligently in his attempt to accomplish the aims of his master. Scaramelli reported that the French were ready to support the English Catholics so as to have at least that faction on their side.¹ But it seems unlikely that the French would have made this unpolitic move. The question of religion was important because James had in the past been willing to listen to both the Protestants and the Catholics. The Pope himself appeared hopeful of James's conversion to Catholicism. As a matter of fact Rosny, although he was not a Catholic, was charged by Henry, under the insistence of the Papal Nuncio, to exhort James to become a Catholic.² This certainly created an interesting situation. But as France hoped to influence English policy, Rosny did not exert himself in this matter.

Rosny was instructed to renew old friendships in his attempt to dissuade James from pursuing a peace policy. He was to champion the cause of the United Provinces and place special emphasis on the urgent support needed by the Dutch in their defense of Ostend. With this in mind, Rosny had a series of audiences with James and with leading English councillors. These audiences revolved mainly

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 34 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).
2. Ibid., X, p. 43 (Cavalli to Doge and Senate).



around the question of Dutch aid as Henry IV was vitally concerned with the fate of the Netherlands. The Peace of Vervins in 1598 had not ended the struggle between France and the Habsburgs, and behind the scenes Henry IV was still supporting the Dutch.¹ This was, in the main, moral support. Although Henry IV supported the Dutch, this did not mean that James would follow suit. The English council advised James to say to the French delegation: "How can you ask me to live at war in order that you may live in peace?"² In fact, the French were accused of trying to convince James to remain at war for their own convenience. But the French were not easily discouraged and kept pressing their arguments. Negotiations between Rosny and the English court continued. James, still new to his position as King of England, was undecided as to what policy he should follow and, as he had not heard from the Spanish, he could not afford to alienate the French completely.

Before the end of June, the French mission had put forward definite proposals. According to Scaramelli, the French declared that their master would never abandon the

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1. Jean H. Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, Histoire de France, ed. Ernest Lavisse (9 Vols., Paris, 1900-1911 Vol.VI), Pt. II, p. 101.
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 55 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).

Dutch and proposed a defensive alliance for France, England and the United Provinces. The English council debated this for two days and replied that such an alliance was at present unacceptable, but that it would advise the king to consider the offer if it were extended to include an offensive as well as a defensive alliance.¹ In the meantime the French were assured that James would not abandon the Dutch. This response seems to have been a delaying tactic as James was hardly ready to make such a positive move. But an agreement had to be made. After much manoeuvring the French and English arrived at an agreement for a basically defensive treaty. The Hampton Court Treaty was signed in July, 1603 with each side promising to come to the aid of the other if attacked by a third power. Continued support of the Dutch was also agreed upon.

Thus it appeared that the French were at least successful in affirming Anglo-French cooperation and getting James to promise not to abandon the Dutch. In minor areas they were not so successful. James had apparently removed a clause from the treaty, which Henry IV had desired. This clause provided that if one of the parties died leaving his son a minor, the other would be bound to help the child

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 61 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).

with all his forces.¹ Henry was interested in such terms because he had recently been very ill. He also indicated his interest in a marriage alliance between his family and that of James. James stalled on this question by pointing out that the children were still too young.² But this did not detract from the treaty itself and Rosny was pleased with what he had accomplished. Throughout his memoirs he continually makes reference to the influence he had over James, claiming even to have advised the king of the bad intentions of some of his councillors.³ What is hard to believe is Rosny's declaration that Cecil was angered and annoyed because of his success with James.⁴ All that this proves is Rosny's concern with his own image.

While Rosny was elated over his accomplishment, James also had reason to be pleased. Anglo-French friendship had been re-affirmed and the Hampton Court Treaty did not compromise his basic desire to make peace with Spain. This peace was in the background at all times. Another early arrival to the diplomatic circus

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1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p.107 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).
 2. Ibid., p. 78 (Badoer to Doge and Senate). It should be noted that James used this excuse to allow him to postpone the question, because in practice marriage alliances between children were not uncommon.
 3. Memoires de Maximilien de Béthune, IV, p. 391.
 4. Ibid., V, p. 6.

which was rapidly growing in London was Count Charles d'Aremberg. He arrived the day before Rosny as the resident ambassador from the Archdukes. He was sent as soon as possible to present the case of the Archdukes to James.¹ D'Aremberg had no authority to make peace but was to put out feelers. The speed which the Archdukes employed in getting their ambassador to London is indicative of their desire to pursue a peace settlement with England. But any such discussion had first to await the arrival of the representatives of the King of Spain, for it was only with their presence that the principle issue of the day could be examined.

When Philip III heard of James's accession he dispatched Don Juan de Taxis (or Tassis), Count of Villa Mediana, on an embassy to England. Taxis was sent to England as resident Spanish ambassador, but he lingered in France and Flanders for most of the summer of 1603 and did not arrive in London until late August. He may have hoped to learn as much as possible about the country of his destination. He did not know what to expect, and the abundant advice he was given, especially by the exiled

1. MacFadyen, "Anglo-Spanish Relations", p. 71.

English Catholics who had been away from England for many years, only confused him.¹ The conflicting reports he received are representative of the many problems which beset diplomacy at this time. While Taxis was dawdling in France and Flanders, reports from England confirmed the early rumours that England wanted peace. With these confused impressions Taxis finally left for England.

His arrival attracted little attention. This can be explained by the fact that London was in the grip of a serious outbreak of plague and the King was elsewhere. Taxis had to wait over a month before he presented his credentials to James. While waiting, he acquainted himself with the English situation. He had expected to find a larger Catholic community to support him in his attempt to gain more freedom for English Catholics.

But instead Taxis was made aware of the anti-Catholic and anti-Spanish feeling still so strong in many Englishmen. In fact the two were regarded as one because during Elizabethan and Jacobean times, Protestant Englishmen regarded the Catholics in their midst as "Spaniolized".² Any uneasiness that Taxis felt grew when he became aware of

1. Loomie, "Toleration and Diplomacy", p. 16.

2. A. J. Loomie, The Spanish Elizabethans (New York, 1963), p. 3.

the Hampton Court Treaty. He was instructed by Philip III to discredit the French and was told to assure James of Spanish support for his claim to the French Crown.¹

Despite this desperate measure, Taxis recognized that the Anglo-French Treaty put him at a disadvantage.

Taxis's first audience with James, held at Winchester to which the Court had fled from the plague, was strained and very formal.² At this meeting, both King and emissary remained aloof but as time passed this formality disappeared. For the next two months Taxis spent his time sounding out English opinion, and he tried to gain support for peace by using the time-honoured method of offering pensions. It should be noted at this time that Spanish demands were still high. For example, Spain demanded possession of the cautionary towns, in return for which she would pay the Dutch debt. This was part of her plan to try to get James to abandon the Dutch and to join Spain in suppressing the rebels.³ But the Spanish soon learned that England did not intend to make a dishonourable peace, and in actuality Taxis had accomplished little when the new year began.

1. MacFadyen, "Anglo-Spanish Relations", p. 77.

2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 102 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).

3. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 7 (Cecil to Winwood).

One reason for this failure was the fact that there was no communication between Taxis and Philip during the winter,¹ and Taxis was uncertain as to his monarch's wishes. At the same time, Taxis was confused farther by the rapid fluctuation of English opinions with regard to peace. This fluctuation was indicated when Scaramelli reported, in October, 1603, that Cecil had told him that if peace were concluded it would mean peace between Spain and Scotland but between Spain and England it would merely mean enemies reconciled.²

It was hoped that plans for the actual peace conference would move forward when the Constable of Castile, who was given treaty-making powers, arrived in Brussels in January, 1604. But he showed no eagerness to get to England; in fact, he lingered in Brussels pleading illness. The Spanish probably delayed beginning negotiations because they hoped that Ostend, under seige for two years, would fall to their forces. The Constable suggested that if the English wanted to negotiate they should send their delegation to him, but this only made James furious.³

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1. Communication was slow at best between London and Madrid and the winter months were especially dangerous in the Channel.
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 108 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).
 3. Loomie, "Toleration and Diplomacy", p. 30.

When the Constable finally announced that he was unable to make the voyage to England, he delegated his authority to Taxis, who was to be assisted by Alessandro Rovida, a senator of Milan. They were joined by d'Arenberg, Jean Richardot, president of the Archdukes' council, and Louis Verreyken, the Archdukes' principal secretary, who represented the Spanish Netherlands. On May 19, 1604, James empowered the Earls of Dorset, Nottingham, Devonshire and Northampton, and Sir Robert Cecil to treat for peace.¹ The delegation met at Somerset House, the residence of the Spanish ambassador.

When the English opened negotiations by raising points of procedure, it appeared that this conference would suffer the same fate as the abortive Boulogne conference. But the problem was straightened out and Nicolo Molin² suggested that it was James's known desire for peace that prompted the settlement.³ Serious negotiations were soon under way but there were problems which could not be

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1. Thomas Sackville, first Earl of Dorset, was the Lord Treasurer; Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, was the Lord Admiral; Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy and Earl of Devonshire, was the pacifier of Ireland; Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, was the Lord Privy Seal, and Sir Robert Cecil, was James's principal Secretary of State.
 2. Molin was Venetian ambassador in England from November, 1603 to January, 1606.
 3. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 156 (Molin to Doge and Senate).

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research. It then proceeds to a literature review, followed by a description of the methodology used in the study. The results of the study are presented in the next section, followed by a discussion of the findings and their implications. The paper concludes with a summary of the main points and a list of references.

The study was conducted in a laboratory setting, using a series of experiments to measure the effects of the treatment on the response of the subjects. The results of the study are presented in the next section, followed by a discussion of the findings and their implications. The paper concludes with a summary of the main points and a list of references.

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solved easily. For example, Spain presented her case and asked that the cautionary towns be sold to her and that the English support of the United Provinces be stopped. However, England realized that the Dutch could not suddenly be abandoned and the English busied themselves with an attempt to get Spain to allow them access to the Indies trade. Finally, after much haggling and manoeuvring over these questions, a treaty resulted¹ in which England probably achieved all she could realistically hope for.

In the first article of the treaty, both sides agreed not to break the treaty nor to enter into treaties opposed to it. This was followed by a declaration which stated that neither side might directly or indirectly aid the enemies of the other. This point was obviously ignored by the English who continued to support the Dutch. James explained this support to the annoyed Spanish by pointing out that it did not come from him, and that he could not prevent his subjects from supporting the Dutch on their own. Article three was an agreement that each side would withdraw commissions which were antagonistic to the other side and

1. Printed in Foedera, XVI, pp. 585-595.



declare them to be null and void. With regard to the Spanish demand for the cautionary towns, the fourth clause of the treaty stated that James could not give up the towns because of previous agreements with the Dutch, but if the Dutch did not fulfill their part of the bargain then James would not have to fulfill his and could dispose of the towns as he saw fit. Thus the door was open and the English did not lose face. Several clauses in the treaty placed restrictions on the Dutch as the Spanish tried their best to stop English support of the rebels. Important commercial matters were also touched upon by the treaty. For example, article six provided for the restoration of trade as it had existed before the war, and following articles set down and explained regulations and conditions of trade and commerce. Spanish seals were to be placed on English merchandise destined for Spanish ports in order to prevent the English from transporting Dutch goods, and unsealed merchandise was to be declared contraband and subject to confiscation. Furthermore, England was to retain her pre-war position and was exempted from the new thirty per-cent Spanish customs duty. Additional customs regulations were mainly concerned with the Spanish attempt to deny Dutch goods access to their ports. Article twelve set down

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It is essential for the business to have a clear and concise record of all income and expenses. This will allow the business to track its financial performance over time and identify any areas where it may be overspending or underperforming. The second part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all assets and liabilities. This will allow the business to track its net worth over time and identify any areas where it may be over-invested or under-invested. The third part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all debts and obligations. This will allow the business to track its financial obligations over time and identify any areas where it may be over-indebted or under-indebted. The fourth part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all taxes and other legal obligations. This will allow the business to track its financial obligations over time and identify any areas where it may be over-taxed or under-taxed. The fifth part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all other financial information. This will allow the business to track its financial performance over time and identify any areas where it may be over-invested or under-invested.

penalties for smuggling. The peace treaty also allowed for the inevitable minor clashes between England and Spain by proclaiming that peace would be preserved in spite of such clashes. However, in case of renewed warfare, articles fifteen and sixteen allowed for the protection of merchants and their goods. They were to be given six months to settle their affairs and withdraw. It was also agreed that English and Scottish galley slaves would be released by the Spanish. With regard to the Indies problem, no real solution was reached and this created long-lasting confusion. According to article twenty-one, the Dutch were invited to adhere to the peace, and it should be noted that their interests were protected as much as possible, since, as future events were to prove, English support was still available. This was the substance of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty. Although there was much that was vague, at least there was agreement upon the basic desire for peace.

The Treaty of London was signed on August 18, 1604, and ratified by James the next day. The Constable came over from Brussels to sign the treaty and the Spanish ratification came on June 5, 1605. James, who could not forgive the Constable's delay, gave him a cold reception and barely found time to see him between hunting trips.

But Queen Anne gave him a warmer welcome, and she made him aware of her desire to see a marriage arrangement between Prince Henry and the Infanta Anne. Thus she sowed the seeds of what was to become a long and complicated problem.

The Dutch and French did all they could to complicate the Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations. Before and after the peace was signed the Dutch, through their representative at the English court, Noel de Caron,¹ loudly lamented the supposed abandonment of their cause. Although they were certain that English opinion was basically anti-Spanish, they feared the effect that Spanish gold would have on the English council.² However, they had little cause to complain for they were always treated fairly by the English. In fact, throughout 1603-1604, it seemed that it was the English who had reason to protest against Dutch activities. In their zeal to keep Flanders isolated by sea, the Dutch sometimes prevented English shipping from passing through to Flemish ports. Furthermore, Dutch ships were in the habit of chasing Dunkirk privateers

1. Caron was Dutch agent and later ambassador in London from 1590 to 1624.

2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, pp. 175, 183 (Molin to Doge and Senate).

into English ports and capturing them. This naturally caused some ill-feeling among those affected, but it did not seriously damage Anglo-Dutch relations.

Nor had the French cause to complain of their treatment by the new English King. During the Spanish peace negotiations James continued to voice his friendship with France and tried to placate Henry IV by keeping him informed of the progress made.¹ Even so, the French continued to complain of James's readiness to achieve his peace and were always warning him of Spanish treachery.² In fact, the French King continued to instruct Beaumont to do all he could to hinder the negotiations. Henry IV went so far as to start the rumor that the Spanish were parties to the Bye and Main Plots,³ but this story was quickly denied by James. The English King was thus faced with pressures from both the Dutch and the French and had a difficult time keeping both parties happy.

However, James found occasion to offer his services to France. A Franco-Spanish commercial dispute arose when in February, 1603, Spain imposed a thirty per-cent tax on

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 169 (Badoer to Doge and Senate).

2. Ibid., p. 127 (Badoer to Doge and Senate).

3. Ibid., p. 167 (Badoer to Doge and Senate).



all merchandise imported into or exported from her domains. France had reason for concern as she sent more exports to Spain than to any other country.¹ In November, 1603, France retaliated with an equal tax on all Spanish goods and followed this by an order which forbade all commerce with Spanish lands. As both countries had great need for each other's goods a flourishing contraband trade resulted. James offered his good offices in this dispute² and the resulting negotiations led to a Franco-Spanish commercial treaty which was signed in Paris in October, 1604.³ However, economic conflicts between the two continued as the treaty could not hope to solve the deep-seated rivalry which existed. James's part in helping the negotiations to get underway was acknowledged in the preamble to the treaty.⁴

Although the French had been in complete opposition to an Anglo-Spanish peace, they soon saw that its completion in August, 1604 did not compromise their position. The English were quick to point this out. Sir Robert Cecil, acting under James's orders, communicated all the terms of

1. Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XII, p. 80.

2. Laffleur de Kermaingant, L'Ambassade de France, I, p. 210.

3. Ibid., pp. 197-229. Details of the Franco-Spanish problems are discussed here and the articles of the treaty set down.

4. Ibid., pp. 229.

the treaty to the French ambassador in London, as further proof of English friendship, and as a guarantee that it contained nothing which contravened the treaty already made with France.¹ Beaumont was pleased with this gesture which ensured English friendship. "Aux yeux de Beaumont la paix avec l'Espagne n'a pas modifié les tendances du roi Jacques, qui, dans le fond de son âme, à toujours haï les Espanols et aime les Français: s'il ne laisse pas apparaître ses veritables sentiment, c'est qu'il craint de déplaire à la Reine et aux Anglais de la faction espagnole."²

Thus James could feel some accomplishment as he had managed to keep France satisfied while he made peace with Spain. Even Beaumont who personally felt that James was weak declared that as long as the King of England lived, and Sir Robert Cecil conducted affairs, neutrality was England's motto.³ Proof of this belief can be seen in a letter from Cecil to Sir Thomas Parry, the English ambassador in Paris, in September, 1604. In this letter, Cecil stated that James was resolved to hold the balance between France and Spain, not to meddle in their quarrels, and to live in

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1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 174 (Molin to Doge and Senate).
 2. Laffleur de Kermaingant, L'Ambassade de France, I, pp. 233-234.
 3. Ibid., p. 237.

peace with both.¹ This state of affairs must have at least satisfied France's fear that James might ally himself with Spain. Thus, by the end of 1604, Anglo-French relations were as amicable as could be expected. But the French realized that their influence at the English court had declined and Beaumont pointed out that the extraordinary embassies from James to Spain and the Spanish Netherlands illustrated this loss.²

At best the diplomatic dealings in London from 1603 to 1604 were complicated and vague, as the Dutch, French, and Spanish all vied to convince their host of the worth of their cause. The atmosphere was clouded more by delegations which arrived from other parts of Europe to present their congratulations to the new King. For the most part these delegations were mere formalities, but some had definite requests to place before James.

The Hanseatic League sent an embassy to congratulate the new English King and to attempt to improve trade relations. The Hansa hoped that their trade relations with England would be clarified. Strained relations had developed

1. Laffleur de Kermaingant, L'Ambassade de France, I, p. 238.

2. Ibid., p. 250.

between England and the Hansa because of the intrusion of English traders, mainly the Company of Merchant Adventurers, into the Hansa's traditional sphere of influence. Friction grew until August, 1597, when an Imperial edict expelled the Merchant Adventurers from Germany.¹ In reply, Elizabeth ordered the Hansa to vacate the Steelyard, which they had owned and operated in London for several centuries.² On its part the Hansa attempted to boycott all English goods even though it lost the power to enforce such decisions. Confusion was the result of all this. The embassy from the Hansa was delegated to attempt to find a solution to these problems. It gained an audience with James in August, 1604, but did not receive a reply to its demands until late September. As it turned out, the King thanked them for their congratulations but refused all their demands.³ This failure indicated the declining position of the Hansa.

Denmark also had claims to present before James. She hoped that her position would be enhanced by the fact that the new English King was married to a Danish princess.

1. H. M. C. Hatfield, VII, pp. 307-308.

2. Wilson King, Chronicles of Three Free Cities, (London, 1904), p. 134.

3. Ibid., p. 136.

Denmark and England had had many past differences which involved English intrusion into the Baltic Sea, the Hanseatic sphere of influence. The Danes controlled the entrance to this inland sea and annoyed the English by their arbitrary control of English shipping. On their part the English antagonized the Danes by seizing their ships on the score of contraband destined to or from Spanish domains.¹ Attempts to solve these problems during Elizabeth's reign had failed, but within a couple of months after James's accession, the Danish king and James were corresponding amicably and promising to end all difficulties between their countries.² It was not long before this friendship established better relations between the two countries.

Thus, the opening year and a half of the reign of James I was crowded with events which laid the foundations for Jacobean foreign policy. The new king, foreign to the demands made upon an English monarch, was beset on all sides by the principal states of Christendom each seeking some favour, and each striving to improve their position. Under the guidance of his English councillors, especially Sir Robert Cecil, the new King of England emerged from

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1. Edward P. Cheyney, "England and Denmark in the Later Days of Queen Elizabeth", Journal of Modern History, I, (March, 1929), p. 15.
 2. See S.P. 75 for the correspondence between James and the King of Denmark.

this initial exposure to foreign solicitations in an enviable position. He was honoured by all, he stayed clear of any close involvement abroad, and he alienated no one. He realized his desire to see his new realm at peace and protected basic English traditional policies. Peace returned to England and this was the notable achievement of early Jacobean times. The next few years would tell what would become of this auspicious beginning.

CHAPTER III

EARLY JACOBEOAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

With the end of the war, England's relations with other states had to be reassessed. Since Spain was weakened and France was steadily regaining her poise, it seemed logical for the English to remain aloof from the Franco-Spanish rivalry. By coming into conflict with one, England would tip the scales in favour of the other. This appreciation, which was based upon the events of the previous reign, is both the justification and the explanation of James's conduct of foreign affairs in the first part of his reign. James did not have to be a pacifist to come to this conclusion, a conclusion which Sir Robert Cecil appeared to have shared.

Anglo-Dutch Relations

The task of keeping France and Spain evenly balanced became more complicated in Jacobean times owing to the growing confidence of the United Provinces. The Dutch state was beginning to emerge as a major factor on the European scene and expected to be regarded as such. England could no longer treat the United Provinces as a poor cousin and in fact the English were unsure quite how to treat her.

Despite this they continued to provide the Dutch with unofficial support and the Dutch found that the Anglo-Spanish peace did not hinder English aid. Furthermore, they continued recruiting troops in England and Scotland, and as the months went by the Venetian ambassadors reported that troops were passing over to the United Provinces. The Spanish were aware of this recruitment and complained bitterly. But the Dutch carried on, proving more and more that they would continue the war with Spain and the Archdukes until such time as it was to their advantage to seek peace. The recruiting in England continued but in 1605 the situation changed as troops were also being raised for service with the Archdukes.

But the troops destined for the Archdukes army were to do little good because the Dutch prevented most of them from crossing the Channel.¹ The Spanish complained to James about this action and demanded that English war ships should help to provide protection. James was unresponsive and not even the sinking of some of the ships carrying English volunteers aroused him. It seemed that Caron had Cecil's support in June, 1605 when he influenced

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 249 (Molin to Doge and Senate).

James not to condemn such Dutch activities. This support was unnecessary for James himself did not appreciate any of his subjects taking service with the Archdukes.¹ In the Venetian papers, there are several examples of James's stand in this matter and they give weight to the idea that James did not want aid to reach the Archdukes from his domain. This pleased the Dutch immensely. Throughout 1606 they successfully recruited troops in England and Scotland without interference from James.

But several incidents between England and the United Provinces, while the latter were still at war, caused dissention. As mentioned above, the Dutch, in their zeal to keep the Spanish Netherlands as weak as possible, had prevented English shipping entering Flemish ports. This blockade was continued as long as the Dutch remained at war. English trade to Spain was also hindered by Dutch attempts to keep all trade from touching the shores of enemy territory. There were times when the Lords of the Council in London were so perturbed at this Dutch action that they instructed Ralph Winwood at the Hague to complain strongly to the States-General.² But these and other

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 244 (Molin to Doge and Senate).
2. Winwood Memorials, II, pp. 34, 301 (Lords of the Council to Winwood).

complaints did not lead to any serious disputes between the two countries. Also, the majority of Englishmen were too wrapped up in their "anti-Spanishism" to consider arguing seriously with their allies of yesterday. For if the Dutch annoyed them occasionally the Spanish annoyed them continually.

The Dutch again annoyed James in April, 1607, when they agreed to a truce with the Archdukes and Spain without consulting him. It should be noted here that James did not keep the Dutch informed about his negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish peace, and perhaps the Dutch remembered this. Besides, the truce surprised the whole of Europe. The Venetian ambassador in London, Zorzi Guistinian,¹ reported soon after that James was disturbed by the truce.² It should not have been wholly unexpected as the Archdukes had been making peace overtures the previous year.³ Even before this, it had become obvious, in the Spanish Netherlands at least, that an armistice was necessary. The Archdukes were in greater need of peace than the Dutch, but the fact that the military campaigns since 1598 had benefitted

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1. Guistinian was ambassador in England from January, 1606 to October, 1608.
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 492 (Guistinian to Doge and Senate).
 3. P. Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, (London, 1961), p. 250.

neither side, made both receptive to the possibility of ending the conflict.¹ As it turned out, the armistice in April, 1607 was wholly favourable to the Dutch.

James was taken by surprise when the truce was announced and apparently was not certain how to treat this new development. In a letter to Ralph Winwood on April 20, Cecil noted that "...for as much as concerned his Majesty's Intentions, whether to second the States in this Peace, or to dissuade them from it, his Majesty would suspend his Resolution until he had heard the States Deputies..."²

The Dutch were not apt to forget James at this point because they still needed his friendship. For this reason they sent two commissioners to him in July, 1607 to acquaint him with what was happening during the truce. At this time they requested James to send commissioners to the Netherlands to join with the French, who were already there, in consultations with the Dutch.³ James was quick to accept this invitation and sent a message to the States-General in August, 1607 that Richard Spencer and Ralph Winwood

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1. Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, p. 249.
 2. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 306 (Salisbury to Cornwallis).
 3. Ibid., p. 320 (Salisbury to Cornwallis).

would be his commissioners.¹ James was quick to reply because the French were taking an avid interest in Dutch affairs. He could not afford to see the Netherlands fall into the hands of the Spanish or the French, and therefore had to be represented at the negotiations.² If not by his own doing, then by Cecil's guidance, he was following the traditional Elizabethan policy.

The peace negotiations did not begin until February, 1608, and the Dutch used the time to strengthen their position. They attempted to induce England and France to join them in a defensive alliance.³ Cecil stated that James was receptive to such a scheme because the French had shown their interest, and also because the Dutch would be more likely to consider paying their English debts.⁴ During the truce negotiations it seemed that James's primary concern was to keep an eye on French action. He was unwilling to sit back and let France receive credit for helping the Dutch secure peace, so that when he discovered that France had guaranteed the Dutch support against

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1. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 328 (James to States-General).
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XI, p. 22 (Guistinian to Doge and Senate).
 3. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 359 (Salisbury to Cornwallis).
 4. Ibid.

Spanish attack he followed suit in 1608. But as discussions continued it appeared that the English King was uncertain of his stand. He was not interested in seeing his neighbors at war but other factors came to the fore and gradually made him aware that peace in the Netherlands would not be altogether desirable from the English standpoint. Guistinian reported that the English were pleased with anything which hindered a successful conclusion of the negotiations because they feared that the growing power and commerce of the Dutch by sea would eventually seriously damage their trade.¹ As soon as it seemed likely that the United Provinces could settle their conflict with the Spanish King, English hostility to Spain would no longer be sufficient to restrain the jealousies and antagonisms which the Dutch were arousing.

Both sides offered delays as the truce negotiations dragged on, but the Dutch gained the stronger position. The Archdukes had a difficult time getting the King of Spain to agree to the Dutch demands. The Dutch were also having their problems because of a split between a war

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XI, p. 110 (Guistinian to Doge and Senate).

party led by Maurice of Nassau, and a peace party led by Oldenbarnevelt.¹ However, the truce, which is known as the 'Twelve Years' Truce, was finally signed in March, 1609. It was only a truce and not a peace, for there were many insoluble problems which prevented any complete agreement. But all in all, the truce must be regarded as a victory for the United Provinces as they were virtually recognized as an independent nation.

With the realization of the Twelve Years' Truce, Anglo-Dutch relations took on a different aspect. Growing financial needs made James susceptible to schemes which brought him into conflict with the Dutch. Such schemes were put forward by those interested in the fishing industry who could look to Dutch prosperity as evidence, and indeed it was during Jacobean times that the Dutch made tremendous gains in commercial power. The fishing industry was one reason for this growing wealth.

During Elizabeth's reign the fisheries were considered as an area which should be exploited by the English. It was believed that encouragement and protection for English fishermen would result in the expansion of the navy.

1. Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, p. 252.

But before this could be attempted, the fish consumption of the English had to be increased. With this in mind there was a good deal of agitation in 1563 in favour of establishing Wednesday as an additional fish day, and many arguments were presented to support this.¹ Continued agitation called for increased English development of the fisheries. In 1581 Lord Burghley asserted that England's "ancient" position in this respect should be regained.²

Several tracts were written on the value of the fisheries, and the leading arguments were summed up in the article by Tobias Gentleman written in 1614. He wrote that it was his intention to show how great sums of money were taken from "His Majesty's Seas" by strangers.³ He showed how the fishing industry had become the backbone of Dutch prosperity and gave the facts and figures of Dutch fishing strength, and also outlined the cost of sending out efficient English fishing vessels.⁴ He dealt with all aspects which would benefit by increased English

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1. R. H. Tawney and Eileen Power (ed.), Tudor Economic Documents (3 Vols., London, 1951), II, p. 104.
 2. Ibid., II, p. 126.
 3. Tobias Gentleman, "England's Way to Win Wealth...", An English Garner, ed. Edward Arber (10 Vols., New York, 1877-1890), VIII, p. 250.
 4. Ibid., p. 251.

activity in this area, but the problems which would arise if the English attempted to compete with the Dutch were not mentioned. The fact that it would be almost impossible for the English easily to become as efficient as their rival, with their thousands of fishing vessels, was ignored. Also ignored was the fact that England's cloth industry would be compromised if she attempted to infringe upon the Dutch fishing interest, because the United Provinces was the main cloth market and this surely would have been closed. Furthermore, the English, who were still allied with the Dutch during early Jacobean times, did not want to antagonize them too much. Thus fish played a part in the formulation of early seventeenth century foreign policy.

It is obvious that Anglo-Dutch relations would suffer if England pursued the ideas of men like Tobias Gentleman. This must have been evident to the Spanish who were quick to take advantage of any factor which would damage Anglo-Dutch amity. Nicolo Molin, in his report on England which was presented to the Government of Venice in 1607, mentioned that the Spanish were trying to foster Anglo-Dutch disharmony. One way to do this was to convince James that it was not in his interest nor that of his subjects to allow the herring fishery around

Scotland to be open to the Dutch.¹

While the Spanish were trying to stir things up, their cause received support from various petitions and discourses calling for England to catch up to the Dutch in the fishing industry. Many Englishmen were growing uneasy with the swift progress of the Dutch, and this coincides with the English government's hesitations once negotiations for the Dutch truce had commenced. In May, 1609, James received a petition from the fishermen of the Cinque Ports requesting that a tax be placed on all the fish which the Dutch exported to England.² During the same month, Sir Nicholas Hales addressed a discourse to James and suggested that the Dutch be forced to buy a license from England before fishing in her waters.³ Other similar suggestions followed. James became even more soured with the Dutch when Hugo Grotius' pamphlet, Mare Liberum was published.⁴

As a result of all this James issued a proclamation in May, 1609, which stated that foreigners would not be

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1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 522 (Molin's report to Doge and Senate).
 2. Cal. S. P. Domestic, 1603-1610, p. 509.
 3. Ibid.
 4. George Edmundson, History of Holland (Cambridge, 1922), p. 122.

allowed to fish on the English and Scottish coasts without special license.¹ Naturally, Dutch public opinion was aroused as it seemed obvious that the proclamation was aimed mainly at the United Provinces. Arguments now passed across the Channel. In October, 1609 Richard Rainsford submitted a proposition which may have seemed attractive to James. It was suggested that the king could raise great profit from the fisheries by imposing a ten per cent tax on all fish sold by foreigners in England.²

The Dutch responded to James's proclamation by sending a special embassy to London in April, 1610. But nothing lasting was accomplished. Even though the English were jealous of Dutch prosperity, and many attributed this to their fishing industry, such problems as the Cleves-Jülich question and the change in French policy owing to the assassination of Henry IV in May, 1610, drew both sides to an accommodation.³ As it turned out, James suspended execution of the proclamation for two years and so solution to the problem was delayed indefinitely.

1. Cal. S. P. Domestic, 1603-1610, p. 509.

2. Ibid., p. 549. Rainsford was, of course, attempting to obtain a patent of monopoly.

3. Edmundson, History of Holland, p. 122.

But the whole problem was to come up again and again. For example, the exclusive right to fish for whales in the waters off Spitzbergen was claimed by the English, although the Dutch would not admit any such claim. In 1613 James conferred the monopoly of these fisheries on the English Muscovy Company. One result of this was that Dutch fishing ships were plundered by ships of the English company. Because of this incident, war ships were sent out to protect Dutch interests. These ships were the deciding factor when the English and Dutch fishing fleets clashed in 1618 and the English were routed.¹ In 1619 new negotiations were carried out in London but the whole problem remained acute until the outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1651.

In 1610, James found that his differences with the Dutch would have to be put aside because there were more pressing demands for cooperation. Of prime importance was the international unrest caused by the death of Duke John William of Cleves in March, 1609. Because he left no heir, various claimants aspired to his ducal dignity and the two best claims were presented by the Brandenburg

1. Edmundson, History of Holland, p. 124.

Elector, John Sigismund, and Wolfgang William of Neuburg, both Protestants. But in an age where subject peoples took their religious leadership from their rulers, the Catholic Emperor and his religious colleagues could not be expected to meekly sit back and see a duchy fall to the Protestants.¹ While the Protestant claimants were arguing among themselves, the Emperor sent Archduke Leopold, bishop of Passau and Strasbourg, to occupy Jülich, an important city in the disrupted duchy. The atmosphere became electric as both sides began raising armies.² The German Protestants looked to France, England and the United Provinces for aid in an alliance of Protestant and anti-Habsburg Europe. After much discussion, James promised to pay for 4,000 foot which would be drawn from the English and Scottish serving in the Dutch armies. Thus the Dutch and English were united because of mutual interests, and the allied army which supported the Protestant claimants entered Jülich in August, 1610.

In 1610 understanding between the two was needed for another reason. Henry IV of France, who was expected

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1. Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany; The Reformation (New York, 1959), p. 298. France under Henry IV was an exception to the idea of the king determining his subjects' religion, but the general practice did exist although it was weakening.
 2. Ibid., p. 299.

to lead the coalition into Cleves, was assassinated on May 4. With the loss of this champion of anti-Habsburg Europe, James and the Dutch were looked upon as leaders of the Protestant cause. Thus, by sheer necessity, England and the United Provinces remained allies. "As was often to happen again in the history of Anglo-Dutch relations, an overriding political necessity had averted a diplomatic collision over economic rivalries."¹

But it must be remembered that while England and the United Provinces were close allies, the seeds of rivalry had begun to take root. Wherever the interests of the two came into close contact rivalry resulted. The fisheries caused strained relations time and time again. Also, English schemes to increase their control of the textile industry brought them into direct conflict with Dutch interests.² Farther afield, Anglo-Dutch rivalry was beginning to take form in such places as the East Indies where the Dutch were quickly established in a position superior to that of the English. This was to result in many incidents later in the reign of James. These problems were discussed at several conferences, but with little success.³

1. Clark, The Colonial Conferences, p. 38.

2. An example is Cockayne's project in 1614.

3. See Clark, The Colonial Conferences, for an excellent summary of all problems leading up to the conferences of 1613 and 1616.

As Cecil was the leading councillor of the early part of James's reign, the Dutch had to solicit his attention as well as the King's. He regarded the Dutch sympathetically and Caron, in his correspondence with Oldenbarnevelt, was forever reaffirming Cecil's good feeling for the Dutch.¹ However, Caron added that Cecil was much more difficult to deal with after he became Lord Treasurer in 1608.² This is understandable as he became personally involved in getting the Dutch to pay their debts. But the fact remains that while Cecil was alive, the Dutch always felt that English friendship was secure. His death in 1612, coupled with James's growing attraction to a Spanish marriage, lowered Dutch fortunes at the court of James I. Of course, there are many other reasons for this, but clearly the Lord Treasurer's presence had been a moderating force between the Hague and London. Because of Cecil's influence, his death in 1612 is a convenient dividing point for the diplomatic history of the reign of James I.

Anglo-Dutch relations changed drastically during

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1. Veenendaal, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, p. 397 (Caron to Oldenbarnevelt).
 2. Ibid., p. 394 (Caron to Oldenbarnevelt).

James's reign. At his accession, and for the next few years, James found himself in a strong position vis-à-vis the Dutch, but as time passed this position gradually weakened. One of the main reasons for this weakening was the tightening of the financial noose about James. But before serious rivalry developed, Anglo-Dutch amity was essential and there were friendly relations between the two.

Anglo-French Relations

During the first two years of James's reign there was goodwill between France and England. French friendship was necessary to James if there was to be any chance of France's paying her English debt and, besides, James hoped to remain on good terms with everyone. For his part Henry IV could not completely alienate James because there was still the possibility of an Anglo-Spanish understanding. Therefore both kings found their mutual friendship to be advantageous.

An example of this goodwill was shown when an equitable solution was sought to the problem created by the seizure of English cloth by the merchants of Rouen in 1601 and again in 1604. The cloth was seized because of its poor quality and because of English deception in

the cloth trade.¹ The dispute was settled by the Treaty of Paris in February, 1606. By this treaty the English and French agreed not to hinder each other's commerce and to establish commissions in all ports to check the quality of goods shipped between them. The treaty also spoke out against piracy. Although the articles of the treaty were not carried out and commercial grievances between the two countries continued, the treaty was significant because it showed an Anglo-French attempt to settle their difficulties. James was always ready to look for such peaceful solutions.

On one occasion, however, Anglo-French relations were seriously threatened. When the Gunpowder Plot was discovered in November, 1605, the French ambassador was one of those caught in a web of suspicion. He was suspect because, a few days before the Plot was exposed, he decided to leave England before his successor arrived. Beaumont, the departing ambassador, was delayed at Dover by bad weather and just managed to set sail three hours before a royal order arrived commanding him to remain there.² Fortunately a serious incident was avoided, and

1. Mariéjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, p. 80.

2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 293 (Molin to Doge and Senate).

the Venetian ambassador in Paris reported soon after that the French were glad that Beaumont had not remained in England any longer.¹ Whether or not Beaumont had any knowledge of the Plot has not been proven, but the English maintained that even if he did not have a hand in the Plot, he must have at least known about it beforehand.² James, himself, wished to avoid discerning any foreign influence in the Plot, and issued a proclamation declaring that no foreign Princes had had any part in it.³ But English suspicions continued even though Henry IV absolved Beaumont of any prior knowledge of the Plot. In order to reaffirm his friendship, the French king sent the Baron de Tour as ambassador-extraordinary to England at the beginning of January, 1606. The warm welcome

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1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 299 (Pruili to Doge and Senate). The meaning behind this was probably that, because of Beaumont's earlier difficulties with James over the Frenchman's supposed support of Arabella Stuart, it was advisable that he be elsewhere. Of course a second meaning could be read into this French belief that Beaumont was no longer in England. It could be suggested that Beaumont did have some prior knowledge of the Plot but managed to get away before being questioned. However, this is pure conjecture.
 2. Ibid., X, p. 293 (Molin to Doge and Senate).
 3. Ibid., X, p. 294 (Molin to Doge and Senate).

accorded to de Tour seemed to dispel any lingering suspicions of France by the English government.

But even though James wanted to remain friendly with France, he found that the interests of his realm took precedence over his ideals. This was the case when the Dutch were negotiating their truce with Spain and the Archdukes. Henry IV had wasted no time in sending two representatives to the negotiations at the Hague, and it appeared that he was forcing his mediation on the Dutch and Spanish because neither had invited him.¹ To justify his interference in the Netherlands Henry invited James to send his representatives to join in the mediation, for in this way it would appear that all the friends of the Dutch hoped to help them achieve a satisfactory truce.² However, James did not need to have Henry suggest his participation. He was only too aware of the need to take an interest in everything which affected the political situation across the Channel, and besides, the Dutch had already invited him to send his delegates. It had been ancient English policy to keep an eye on the Netherlands because of their close economic ties and the fact that this area, in the hands of a rival, would pose a threat

1. Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, p. 113.

2. Ibid.

to the security of the island. French domination was especially feared because France would be in a threatening position and could very easily dominate the Channel.

Therefore, one of the most pressing reasons for English interest in the truce negotiations was the very presence of the French representatives at the Hague.

The Hague had made overtures to both London and Paris for a defensive league among the three powers. Henry IV was receptive and went so far as to guarantee his armed support to the Dutch if hostilities reopened.¹ Furthermore, Henry's representatives were instructed not only to act as observers, but also to play an active role in support of the Dutch position. James could not ignore these French advances and in fact one of the reasons for his interest in the Dutch request was France's enthusiasm.² In January, 1608 when the French and Dutch signed a defensive alliance, James followed suit later in the year. Cecil summed up the English and French positions when he wrote to Sir Ralph Winwood; "... that neither the King our Master nor the French do really intend this Truce as you have proposed it, but only in as much

1. Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, p. 113.

2. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 359 (Salisbury to Cornwallis).



as they may serve their own turns by it."¹ The Venetian ambassadors in both Paris and London also reported the English and French self-interest.²

The two kings vied with each other to influence the concluding of the Dutch truce. Although there had been indications that James hoped to see the Dutch truce delayed, this was overshadowed by the fact that he did not want to see Henry receive all the credit for its conclusion. In fact the signing of the Twelve Years' Truce in March, 1609 resolved a difficult situation for James as he had tried to remain on friendly terms with France and yet not yield any ground to her.

But James was to have a difficult time remaining on good terms with France for the seeds of Anglo-French rivalry were still present. These were outlined by Sir George Carew, James's ambassador in Paris from 1605 to 1609, who was perhaps England's foremost expert on the subject matter of treaties. When he returned from his mission he presented to James a discourse on his impressions of France.³ He stressed the growing power of France and pointed out that England had more need of French friendship

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1. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 450 (Salisbury to Spenser and Winwood).
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XI, pp. 172, 203 (Giustinian to Doge and Senate, and Foscarini to Doge and Senate).
 3. Cambridge, 488.

than the reverse. This could have been a quiet criticism of English foreign policy as he went on to outline England's inferior position when compared to that of France, and warned that there were many conflicting interests which were bound to grow in the future. Carew even suggested that England should encourage the fragmentation of France into another Germany, which could be accomplished with the concurrence, not only of some powerful families in France, but of Spain also.¹ This was a staggering suggestion at best and could not be considered to be a part of James's peaceful plans, but it illustrated the kind of ideas the King constantly encountered.

Nevertheless, Anglo-French aims came together once again in the dispute over the Duchy of Cleves. This affair was a test of strength between the German Protestant Union and the Spanish supported German Catholic League. When the Union was formed in 1608 the signatories looked to Henry IV as a patron,² and rightly so for when the dispute over Cleves took on menacing proportions, the French King promised to lead a large army in their cause.

1. Cambridge, 488.

2. Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, p. 119.

But Henry was assassinated as he was about to march to join his armies in May, 1610. James was naturally shocked, and at the same time concerned as to how this would affect French policy in the duchy. He had reason to worry because there were many pro-Spanish groups within France, including old Leaguers, many nobles, and the majority of the clergy.¹ It took a while for the regent, Marie de Medici, to decide France's course of action but when she did it was a policy which honoured the late king's commitment to support the German Protestants in Cleves. In fact the French army joined the English, Dutch and German forces at the seige of Jülich in the late summer of 1610.

The death of the effervescent Henry IV led to an improvement of James's relations with France. There had been evidence of guarded rivalry throughout their kingly relationship and as early as July, 1603, there were rumors that the King of France had little use for his English counterpart.² Henry personally disliked James and warned others not to put much stock in the English King's promises. He advised the Venetians in March, 1607 not to place any reliance on James's support, but to treat his words as wind.³

1. Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, p. 107.

2. Cal. S. P. Domestic, 1603-1610, p. 23.

3. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 484 (Pruili to Doge and Senate).

Henry always found new things to criticize in his English cousin and when James sent a copy of his Premonition to all most Mighty Monarchs, Kings, Free Princes, and States of Christendom to Henry in 1609, the French King mocked his waste of time on useless projects. This is ironic for Henry had never met James, but was advised by Rosny, Beaumont and other leading servants that the English King was weak and frivolous.¹ Yet although Henry had little respect for James the man, he had to regard him in a better light as King of England.

James, on his part, did not want to see the French King's prestige and power enhanced and probably was envious of the dynamic Henry.² Although this was personal it blended well with basic English interests.

James's outlook toward France changed after Henry's death. Marc Antonio Correr, the Venetian ambassador in London from October, 1608 to June, 1611, reported in June, 1610 that James had been displaying a growing affection toward France as it had become evident that her rivalry and power were waning and that, on account of the tender

1. Laffleur de Kermaingant, L'Ambassade de France, I, p. 234.

2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XI, p. 472 (Correr to Doge and Senate).

age of the new king, she would require support rather than restraint.¹ This was again the Elizabethan policy of supporting France when her power waned, which now happened with the loss of Henry IV. In other words, France needed English friendship to offset pressure from Spain, as had been the case two decades before when Henry IV was struggling to unite France under his leadership. Probably this policy was influenced by Cecil who was schooled in Elizabethan methods. James's tendency to cultivate the friendship of France with increased diligence was noted by Correr.² This renewed goodwill took on positive meaning when the English and French signed a new defensive treaty in 1610. Now James was regarded with more deference by the French who even went as far as to repay part of their English debt.

Although there were points of dispute, Anglo-French relations remained harmonious during the early part of the reign of James I. The fact that Anglo-French amity was preserved despite a crisis like the Gunpowder Plot showed that Henry IV and James I had a mutual need for friendship. The one in order to keep England from falling into the

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XI, p. 500 (Correr to Doge and Senate).

2. Ibid., XII, p. 102 (Correr to Doge and Senate).

Spanish camp, the other because of a desire to remain on friendly terms with everyone. In this they were successful.

Anglo-Spanish Relations

While early Jacobean contact with the United Provinces and France was generally cordial, this situation was in part a carry-over from the previous reign. However, this cordiality was not in evidence with regard to Spain and her possessions, and in fact the Spaniards had been the enemy for so long that it was hard for most Englishmen to adjust to friendship with Spain.

Even after the peace treaty was signed anti-Spanish sentiments prevailed in England, and these sentiments were encouraged by the merchants who traded with the Spanish. They continually claimed ill-treatment from the Spanish and related troubles they encountered especially on religious grounds.¹ At the same time the English did not hesitate to antagonize the Spanish, as was shown by their flouting of customs regulations.² But such disputes

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1. They presented several petitions to Parliament for the redress of Spanish wrongs. Commons Journal, I, p. 373. Spanish merchants' grievances of 1607 are listed in James Spedding (ed.), The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon (7 Vols., London, 1866-1874), III, p. 346.
 2. In reply Cecil pointed out that English merchants were also at fault. He also declared that the Crown was the only authority which could make war and peace. See Spedding, The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon, III, p. 352 & pp. 356-357.

were inevitable if only because the long period of war had just ended. Although James himself was not anti-Spanish, he used the existence of this feeling in England to his advantage. While he had agreed to allow the Archdukes to recruit troops in his domain, he found that a little discouragement stopped too many of his subjects from volunteering. James favoured the Dutch as they owed him money and therefore he did not want to become too involved in this recruiting. Those troops that the Archdukes did manage to raise then faced the problem of crossing the Dutch patrolled Channel. And no matter how much the Spanish and Flemish complained, James would not offer his protection to the transport of these troops. In this way the Dutch could not take offense. Still, James did not like to choose between the United Provinces and the Spanish Netherlands and their quarrels were to complicate England's foreign relations with Spain from 1604 to 1609.¹

These relations were further aggravated by anti-Catholic and, therefore, anti-Spanish sentiments. These

1. MacFadyen, "Anglo-Spanish Relations", p. 165.

sentiments were augmented by the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, as it was suspected that members of the Plot were aided and encouraged from the Spanish Netherlands. James did not believe this but the Archdukes annoyed him when they refused to hand over two suspects in the Plot which were in their protection.¹ As a result, James became more adamant in discouraging the Archdukes' recruitment in his realm. Although there were never many Englishmen in the Flemish army² their very presence caused alarm during the Gunpowder Plot, because part of the anxiety of the Plot was fear of an invasion of England by these troops. James was sufficiently convinced of the feasibility of such an invasion to have contemplated the recall of his subjects serving in the Archdukes' army.³

English suspicion of Spain was heightened in 1607 when the fleeing Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell found refuge in Spanish lands. Tyrone had been the leader of the Irish during their great rebellion against Elizabeth's

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1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 310 (Molin to Doge and Senate).
 2. MacFadyen, "Anglo-Spanish Relations", p. 171. MacFadyen declares that only 1,000 Englishmen succeeded in evading the Dutch and getting to Flanders. He states that there were also about 2,000 Scottish and Irish in the Flemish army.
 3. Cal. S.P. Venetian, X, p. 302 (Molin to Doge and Senate).



authority and was discontent after his submission in 1603. Still, he hoped to lead the Irish to freedom and often there were rumors of his conspiracy in Ireland. In July, 1607, Tyrone was summoned to London on the pretext of a land dispute in which he was involved.¹ But his followers had forebodings about the journey because they felt it an English trick to get the foremost Irish lord away from his people.² Tyrone felt he had no alternative but to flee the country and attempt to solicit Spanish aid for his cause. The Earls sailed at the beginning of September, never to return and only to see their pleas go unheeded at the Spanish Court. For Spain was not interested in another fruitless voyage to Ireland as she wanted peace with England.

But even though the Spanish wanted peace with England, they were always prepared to take advantage of any obstacles which confronted James. James's financial problems offered the Spanish such an opportunity. The English king was attracted to a Spanish marriage for one of his children because of the possibility of a large dowry. Marriage negotiations had long been absent from the English scene

1. S. R. Gardiner, History of England, (10 Vols., London, 1905), I, p. 414.

2. Ibid., p. 416.

due to the long reign of the Virgin Queen; however, the appearance of James and his family re-opened the subject. The longest and most troublesome negotiations were to take place with Spain. In the early years of James's reign it was usually the Spanish who hinted at a marriage alliance, but later when James was in serious need of money it seemed that he was prepared to do anything to capture a Spanish dowry. As early as 1604, the Spanish ambassador in London, Don Juan de Taxis, had a list of conditions Spain would demand if an Anglo-Spanish marriage was to take place.¹ As could be expected, these conditions dealt mainly with the religious problem, but nevertheless Spain appeared so interested in a marriage alliance that the question of religion was usually put off as a topic for later discussion.

Little progress was made in the negotiations until 1611,² as it seems that both sides had been using the attractions of such an alliance to further their own needs. Indeed Spain was willing to pursue any course that would bring her to closer friendship with England, in her attempt to stop English aid of the Dutch. But the English were wary of these advances because, if they alienated the Dutch,

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1. Francisco de Jesus, Narrative of the Spanish Marriage Treaty, ed., and trans. S. R. Gardiner, (London, 1869), p. 104.
 2. Ibid., p. 105.

the United Provinces would be open to French influence.

However, James was willing to keep the subject of a Spanish marriage open as it was personally attractive to him and it illustrated his peaceful intentions toward England's old enemy.

Spain also tried to strengthen her position in England by liberally distributing pensions. The five English delegates at the peace conference in 1604 were all given large pensions after the peace was signed, but with little result. Sir Robert Cecil was given one of these pensions and he received several more in later years, but the Spanish never gained his services. The Spanish court breathed a sigh of relief when in 1612 Cecil's death removed him from the scene. According to Piero Pruiili, the Venetian ambassador in Madrid at this time, the Spanish saw his death as the removal of the main obstacle to their interests in England.¹ Actually none of the Spanish pensions brought returns, but they acted as a nuisance value for the French and Dutch complained that Spanish gold was working against them at the English court. But this was to James's advantage as the French and Dutch were made aware that Spanish influence might gain ground if they were too troublesome.

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XII, p. 394 (Pruili to Doge and Senate).

Another reason why Spain tried to influence James in her favour was that her domestic problems required peace abroad. Sir Charles Cornwallis, English ambassador to Spain from 1605 to 1609, reported many times that Spain was suffering internal disorders.¹ Even though Cornwallis at times exaggerated this weakness, in fact Spain was beset with troubled times which was one of the reasons she accepted the truce with the Dutch. She added to her internal difficulties when she expelled the Moriscos, the partially Christianized Moors, from their homeland.² This was a reason why she could not aid the Catholic cause in the Cleves-Jülich dispute. Only after she had dealt with her internal problems was she again able to turn her attentions to international affairs.

Thus Spain needed peace with England during the early Jacobean period and counted on the English king to acquiesce. Although English and Spanish interests conflicted on occasion, this did not lead to war. However, the attractions of attacking Spanish maritime riches fascinated many³ and throughout this period, the Venetian ambassadors in England

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1. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 96 (Cornwallis to Salisbury).
 2. Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 299-303.
 3. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 462 (Guistinian to Doge and Senate).



reported that many Englishmen wished for a renewal of war with Spain. But in actuality there was little for England to gain from a Spanish war. England's trade and commerce was on the rise as her adventures to the distant corners of the world increased. In 1606 England planted the seeds of future colonial greatness with the grant of the first Virginia charter. The colony had a shaky beginning but at least a beginning was made.¹ The Spanish were unhappy with this intrusion into what they felt was their sphere of influence but did not press the issue with James.²

In all, James enjoyed peace with Spain. Under Cecil's guidance he kept the Spanish peace while not falling victim to Spanish wiles. English interests were protected as well as could be expected in an age where peace with any country did not guarantee safety. Even though there was much anti-Spanish feeling in England, James's personal desire to live in peace, combined with Cecil's realization of the need for peace, led to Anglo-Spanish mutual tolerance.

Early Jacobean Relations With Venice and Other European States.

While the United Provinces, France, and Spain were of primary importance in James's foreign policy, he also had

1. Gardiner, History of England, II., p. 52.

2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XII, p. 428 (Pruili to Doge and Senate).



to be aware of other European states. For, although England was not intimately involved with these other states, she played a leading part in international affairs and therefore came into contact with all of Europe. James took a lively interest in Italy, Scandinavia, and Germany during the early years of his reign, and some of the principal issues of European foreign affairs involved these areas.

As far as James was concerned the focal point of Italian affairs was the Republic of Venice. In fact, the only resident English ambassador in Italy was in Venice, and he was responsible for English interests and nationals throughout the peninsula. In 1603 the Republic of Venice was but a shadow of the power she had been for many centuries, and even though she was still a great city state her importance was on the decline as a result of the growth of the commercial adroitness of other states in the Mediterranean. At the time of Elizabeth's death in March, 1603, diplomatic relations between England and Venice were being re-established.¹ The Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, arrived in London in 1603 and was charged with the task of negotiating the basic points of interest and dispute between England and

1. Diplomatic relations had been established long before, but they were suspended in July, 1557 because of a tariff dispute. Scaramelli arrived in England to re-open relations just before Elizabeth died.

Venice.

Piracy was the most pressing matter for the Venetians and they hoped that a solution to this scourge would be found through negotiations in England. Venice complained that many pirates came from England, and in fact during the last part of the sixteenth century English pirates and privateers infested the Mediterranean. In effect, the English gained a notorious reputation for piracy and often it was expected that a ship flying the Cross of St. George would be a pirate ship.¹ Piracy was not a new phenomenon nor was it expected to disappear suddenly, but the Venetians did hope that with the accession of a new English monarch and with renewed diplomatic relations that their claims for restitution of property would be granted.

The English privateers had little encouragement to return home after the death of Elizabeth since they would face reprisals by the Venetian ambassador and by other foreign officials. The Venetians were quick to air their demands, but there were many problems placed in their way by influential Englishmen who benefitted from privateering interests. Scaramelli reported in June, 1603, that his

1. Sir Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legend, (Oxford, 1952), p. 136.



efforts to uncover the source of privateering were greeted with repugnance as some of the Lords of the Council had an interest in bucaneeering.¹ During the following months he stated this fact again and again, and even went so far as to name the Lord High Admiral, the Earl of Nottingham, as the principal protector of the privateering interests.² But Scaramelli may have been hasty in his accusations for there was little that Nottingham could do about the pirate scourge. It would have taken much more strength than England possessed to deal effectively with the pirates.³ However, James himself hated piracy and showed this at the beginning of his reign when he issued a proclamation in May, 1603 withdrawing the letters of marque granted by Elizabeth, and in September issued another proclamation to repress all piracies and depredations upon the seas.⁴ But all this was to have little practical value for the Venetians, and they continued to voice their complaints and demands at the English court for

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1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 246 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).
 2. Ibid., X, p. 59 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).
 3. Ronald O. Moore, "Some Aspects of the Origin and Nature of English piracy, 1603-1625" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1960), p. 103.
 4. Cal. S. P. Domestic, 1603-1610, p. 41. Letters of marque were licences granted at least as early as the fourteenth century to allow private ships to engage lawfully in naval warfare; commissions were issued to take reprisals against foreign shipping for unredressed piracy.

many more years. The English themselves met Venetian claims with accusations of their own, for although the Venetians were quick to condemn piracy they failed to distinguish between lawful trade and piracy. In fact English piracy was exaggerated by the Venetians in their zeal to try to recover the dominance of the Levant trade. But this could not take away from the fact that Venice hoped to rid the Mediterranean of pirates, and she looked to James for aid in this matter.

The Venetians were also concerned with commercial problems which had developed between themselves and the English. In the past the English had been able to buy Levantine goods in Antwerp instead of going to the source, but when the Antwerp market closed the English again looked to the Levant. As a result, a group of London capitalists secured from Elizabeth in 1581 the sole privilege of trading in the Levant for seven years.¹ A new charter was drawn up in 1592 which combined this Levant Company with the Venice Company which had been formed in 1583. So began the great Levant Company, but its formation met hostility from the countries already established in trade with the

1. E. Lipson, The Economic History of England, (6th ed., London, 1961), p. 337.

Ottoman Empire. The Venetians tried everything possible to keep the English out of the Levant but they had little success,¹ for the Sultan saw in Elizabeth a potential ally against Spain.

The very presence of the Levant Company strained English relations with the Italian States. Relations were also disturbed when English warships in the Mediterranean interfered with Venetian vessels on the pretext that they were carrying contraband or Spanish goods. The result was constant friction with Venice² which lasted until the coming of the Anglo-Spanish peace in 1604. In addition, the Levant Company lived in fear of reprisals from the Turks, Venetians and other Mediterranean powers because of the actions of English pirates. Such was the precarious beginning of the Levant Company. It is of interest to note that the Dutch, who were shortly to become such great rivals of the English in this sphere, entered the Levant trade in the 1590's under the sponsorship of the Levant Company.³

The Venetians found reason to rejoice in March, 1603

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1. Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company, (Oxford, 1935), p. 13.
 2. Ibid., p. 25.
 3. Ibid., pp. 28-9.

when with the death of Elizabeth, the Levant Company promptly renounced its patent and was dissolved. This action came because the Company was unable to pay the £4,000 a year which the Crown required and declared that it could barely meet the charges of its ambassador in Constantinople.¹ The Company had agreed to pay this sum when it was granted a new charter in 1600. Scaramelli was excited with this turn of events as he hoped that Venice would regain her old position as middleman in the English need for Levantine goods.² The Venetians were relieved when the English position in Constantinople was threatened because of James's peace advances toward Spain.³ The Turks had found England a useful ally during the Anglo-Spanish war and it was doubtful that they would still favour her after the Anglo-Spanish peace. It was for these reasons that the Venetians had hopes of seeing their fortunes rise with the accession of James I.

But their hopes were premature, for the Levant Company was not dead. When James threatened to levy impositions on currants and wine in order to recoup himself for the £4,000,

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1. Wood, A History of the Levant Company, p. 37.
 2. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 64 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).
 3. Ibid., X, p. 113 (Scaramelli to Doge and Senate).



the merchants decided to petition for the renewal of their monopoly on the same terms as before. This led to drawn out negotiations between the merchants and the crown, as everyone hoped to enter this lucrative trade.¹ A new charter was finally agreed upon in December, 1605 and the age of great prosperity for the Levant Company began. This rival of the Levant Company brought hard times to Venice as a result, and with passing years, her position in the Levant trade declined. Increased competition in trade also contributed to this decline. For example, the English and French were able to sell cloth at a much lower price than the Venetians and the latter could do nothing about it.² In addition, the superiority of Baltic timber to Mediterranean timber in ship building gave the northerners, especially the Dutch, another advantage since Venice had to buy her timber supplies from them. Thus the Venetians found that they were on the defensive in their trade relations with England and with other northern European nations.

The loss of Venetian power to dictate to the English commercial interests in the Mediterranean was readily

1. Wood, A History of the Levant Company, pp. 38-9.

2. Ibid., p. 44.



illustrated by the currant trade in Zante, a Venetian island off the coast of Greece. In 1602 the Venetian Senate passed a law forbidding the people of Zante to sell directly to the English as it hoped to draw the English ships to Venice to do their trading. The result of this was that the English shifted their trade to the Turkish port of Patras near Zante. Zante complained bitterly to Venice but found a solution by smuggling their goods over to Patras and thus to the English. The Venetian government was slow to realize its error but again opened the currant trade at Zante to the English in May, 1609.¹

From the preceding it appears that Anglo-Venetian affairs at the beginning of the seventeenth century were at variance. There were points of conflict between the Venetians and the English but this did not hinder a mutual attempt to develop harmonious relations. The Venetian ambassadors in London and the English ambassadors in Venice believed that goodwill and friendship would be mutually beneficial. This had practical results for Venice during her great dispute with the Papacy in 1606-1607. Relations between Venice and Rome had long been difficult owing to

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XI, p. xxxi.

political and religious disagreements. In secular matters, the Papal states traditionally conflicted with Venice over disputed territory between them and in religious matters, the two clashed because the church in Venice was secondary to secular affairs.¹ With the death of Pope Clement VIII in 1605, and the election of Paul V, disagreements between Venice and Rome increased. Paul wanted the strength of the church restored in Venice² and events rapidly came to a head in April, 1601, when he issued bulls of excommunication against the Republic. The affair took on an international countenance since Spain supported the Pope and Venice looked abroad for assistance.

The Venetians had to look no farther than the person of Sir Henry Wotton, the English resident ambassador in Venice. Wotton, an ardent Protestant with grand ideas for a European alliance against Rome, welcomed the dispute and "...kept adding as much fuel as he could to the conflagration."³ Primarily he acted according to the dictates of his personality but he also had authority from James who was happy to see

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1. Alethea Wiel, Venice, (4th ed., London, 1894), p. 375.
 2. Pearsall Smith, Sir Henry Wotton, Life and Letters, (2 vols., Oxford, 1907), I, p. 79.
 3. Ibid.,



the Venetians stand up to the Pope. James openly and frequently declared his support of Venice.¹ However, the Venetians and Wotton hoped for more than gestures and their hopes were realized when James offered his aid if it was needed.

Venice was greatly encouraged by James's gesture and Wotton offered his master's support though he was warned to be less ardent.² England's support, which was continually fed by Wotton's zeal, produced results as Venice gained confidence by it in her negotiations with Rome. Although the reliability of English promises was not tested, as the dispute between Venice and Rome was settled by April, 1607, James emerged as champion of the Venetian cause.

This enhanced James's image, but in fact it was the good offices of Henry IV that soothed the dispute. When the Venetian-Papal dispute broke out there was much feeling in France in favour of Venice and Henry IV shared these sentiments, but he did not want to argue with the Pope so he offered his mediation.³ "Although the actual conclusion of the great contest was due to the masterly diplomacy of Henry IV, the Venetians always felt a particular gratitude to James I, and maintained that his timely and courageous

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, X, p. 361 (Guistinian to Doge and Senate)
2. Ibid., X, p. 432 (Guistinian to Doge and Senate).
3. Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, p. 110.

declarations in their favour was one of the main causes of their triumph."¹

Friendly relations with Venice also had positive results for James. A case in point concerns the Earl of Tyrone. When the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell fled abroad from Ireland they were welcomed in several European states but at the request of Sir Henry Wotton, the Venetian government warned Tyrone not to enter Venetian territory. Wotton was pleased with this display of friendship and reported it to James,² who welcomed the gesture as a confirmation of Anglo-Venetian amity.

Another example of goodwill came under much more difficult circumstances in 1609. In that year appeared James's Premonition to all most Mighty Monarchs, Kings, Free Princes, and States of Christendom. As the book defended Protestantism and attacked Catholicism, it was hardly likely that any of the Catholic states would receive it but James was determined to present it to every state, even though most of the Catholic princes refused it outright or destroyed it immediately. Venice was placed in an awkward position because she was a Catholic state and at the same

1. Smith, Sir Henry Wotton, I, p. 85.

2. Ibid., I, p. 418 (Wotton to James).



time friendly with James. Furthermore, the Papal Nuncio voiced loud protests to any Venetian plans of receiving the book and the dilemma became more acute. The Venetian Senate proposed as good a solution as possible when in July, 1609 it was decided that the Doge would receive the book, return thanks, and then lock it up before anyone could read it. Wotton was very pleased when he heard that the Senate was to receive the book, but when he discovered the details he threw a terrible tantrum and threatened to resign from his post. Fortunately James was not as hot-headed as his ambassador, and Wotton was given orders to apologize to the Senate and to reaffirm Anglo-Venetian friendship.¹ In order to placate James the Venetians sent Francesco Contarini as special ambassador to explain their position. James was pleased with this act of friendship, and tranquility was reaffirmed.

Another example of Anglo-Venetian friendship was shown by the way the Venetians treated Sir Henry Wotton. Wotton, who was an ardent Protestant, kept alive his dream of an anti-Habsburg and anti-Papal League and Venice was to be a part of this league. Even though this vociferous Protestantism was annoying to the Nuncio, the Venetians allowed Wotton more

1. Smith, Sir Henry Wotton, I, p. 106.

religious freedom than ambassadors were usually given.

Wotton's counterparts in London are of interest in attempting to determine the role of ambassadors in early seventeenth century Europe. The Venetians were preoccupied with their own problems but they were usually able to give astute reports of happenings in England. Certainly their descriptions were colored by their personalities and nationality, but these reports still remain among the best sources of information for the period. From them can be determined who really wielded the power in Jacobean times, or at least who the Venetians felt wielded the power. Throughout the time that Sir Robert Cecil was alive, his authority was recognized by the Venetians. They also presented their views on James himself for he was usually accessible to them as he was to other ambassadors. Impressions of leading Englishmen of the time are also available from the reports of the Venetian ambassadors for through these reports we are brought close to such basic considerations of diplomacy as the problems over precedence.

Although Anglo-Venetian relations were not of prime importance to James they are an example of early Jacobean success in foreign affairs. These relations were an example of all that constituted the diplomacy of the age, and trade, commerce, religion and politics were parts of this.

There were difficulties between England and Venice but they never seriously interfered with the understanding between them. In all, Anglo-Venetian relations are significant because of their harmony.

In the early Jacobean period there was little English interest in Scandinavia but family ties with Denmark encouraged amiable relations. There were commercial disputes between England and Denmark but they were smoothed over because of this relationship as James I and Christian IV of Denmark wanted their realms at peace with one another. And Christian hoped for James's support in his disputes with the rising Swedish state. But Sweden also sought English support, and she sent an embassy to London in the summer of 1610 to ask for help. James was friendly to both but remained neutral and offered to seek a solution to the dispute.¹ This dispute involved territorial claims and resulted in Denmark's declaring war on Sweden in 1611. James was not partisan in this matter but merely hoped that peace would soon return, and it was through his mediation that a settlement was reached between Denmark and Sweden in January, 1613.² This was an example of the success of

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1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XII, p. 26 (Correr to Doge and Senate).
 2. Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden, (2 Vols., London, 1953), I, p. 69.

James's peacemaking efforts.

There was a lull in communication between England and Germany after the German Princes welcomed James to his new throne. However, with the development of the Cleves-Jülich dispute England became seriously involved with Germany. James's positive action in this dispute helped lead to a satisfactory though temporary solution. Later, however, when the duchy was again to cause an eruption in the international scene, James was not able to act in a strong way. James was much criticized for the policy he followed in Germany in these later years, but this criticism should not be applied retroactively to the early years.

Throughout the early Jacobean period the relations among England and her European neighbors were characterized by an atmosphere of toleration if not friendship. Under the guidance of Cecil, James managed to hold his own in the tricky diplomacy of the age. Cecil's foreign policy was Elizabethan: "peace if possible, with the maximum commitments abroad; a benevolent - if not too expensive - patronage of the Protestant Netherlands, and facilities for expanding trade."¹ Nevertheless, the policy of

1. J. Hurstfield, "Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury: Minister of Elizabeth and James I", History Today, VII (May, 1957), p. 286.

Elizabeth, created out of necessity and guided by her genius, could not expect to last long under James because the situation was further complicated by the appearance of the United Provinces as a new power, and by the fact of growing domestic problems which created new problems that even Elizabeth would have found impossible to solve. But the early years of James's reign were accented by harmony in the international scene and helped to create a prosperous time for the English people.

CHAPTER IV

ASPECTS OF EARLY JACOBEOAN FOREIGN POLICY

Jacobean foreign policy was a carry-over from the Elizabethan period as James adopted the basic ideas of his predecessor. It was with the guidance of Sir Robert Cecil, the chief minister at Elizabeth's death, that James combined this traditional foreign policy with new factors of a domestic and foreign nature. It took James and his new realm a few years to become acquainted and through these years, James was generally successful in an international arena full of uncertainties and pitfalls. Through this period he strengthened his reputation as a peacemaker.

James Stuart has been branded by his contemporaries and by most writers ever since as "the peacemaker".¹ This brand is not odious in itself, but the general context as applied to James often reveals a derogatory implication. Several factors which existed before and after the early seventeenth century serve to clarify this. James had the

1. The title of D. H. Willson's fifteenth chapter is "The Peacemaker". James's contemporaries were all agreed that he was a man of peace. For example Sir Anthony Weldon stated: "The king was a peaceable and merciful prince...king of mercy, as well as peace...". Sir Walter Scott, Secret History of the Court of James the First, (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1811), p. 339.



misfortune to follow the golden age of Elizabeth, with all its romance, adventure, and glory, and he lived during the fiery and colorful reign of the great Henry IV of France. During James's reign the new Dutch Republic showed signs of becoming a vast commercial empire and Germany was drifting into the Thirty Years War. James lived in the great buccaneering era of European history and in an atmosphere of adventurers and soldiers of fortune, when a Maurice of Nassau, or later a Gustavus Adolphus, commanded the awe of Europe. This was an age of exploration and vigorous adventure where one who expounded a theory of peace for Christendom seemed strange. James's pacifism was viewed as weakness in the eyes of contemporaries as they felt that only failure would result from such a theory, and in their eyes James, a peacemaker, was fated to be regarded as inept.

It is evident through the many poems, songs, and sermons lauding James as a peacemaker,¹ that he had developed this reputation. Indeed, throughout his reign in England James did all he could to foster peace, although

1. Millar Maclure, The Paul's Cross Sermons, 1534-1642, (Toronto, 1958), p. 97.



there was little known about him in 1603 except that he appeared to be a man of peace.¹ This image was reinforced when he brought peace to England in 1604. But actually James combined his desire for peace with the needs of his new realm, because with the exception of a few war profiteers, Englishmen generally had been searching for some sort of peace. Many problems stood in the way of this search, but with the arrival of James the balance was tipped in favour of peace. The peacemaker reputation now began to grow.

James was insistent and proud of what he felt was his greatest gift to his new subjects - peace. And when he opened his first parliament in March, 1604, he proudly declared that "...at My coming here...I found the State imbarqued in a great and tedious War; and only by Mine Arrival here, and by the Peace of My Person, is now Amity kept, where War was before...".² But James did not ignore the needs of his realm. He was cautious in his desire for peace and he went on to say that he hoped peace would remain,

1. When James arrived in England in 1603 he was lauded as a man of peace. There was a rush to buy the newly published Basilikon Doron, in which the new king spoke out for peace. See Willson, King James VI & I, p. 166.

2. Commons Journal, I, p. 142.



but "...a secure and honourable War must be preferred to an unsecure and dishonourable Peace..."¹ In this, James showed that he was not without an appreciation of the demands of kingship.

The Anglo-Spanish peace of 1604 was the result of the combination of James's natural desire for peace and quiet, and the English hope for a respite from the long war. But it took one-and-a-half years for the actual peace to be realized and this tends to suggest that James was cautious in his desire for peace. His desire for caution, and the time needed for negotiations to get underway, brought a gradual peace.

During the long negotiations for peace, a pattern emerged which reappears later in James's reign. Under the guidance of Sir Robert Cecil, James found that the knowledge of his peaceful manner in the minds of foreign countries helped him to evade difficult situations. In reply to a Spanish request for aid against the Dutch in 1603, James, according to Cecil, stated that "...neither the Condition of his own Estate, neither the Inclination of his Mind did

1. Commons Journal, I, p. 142. James said the same thing in the Basilikon Doron.

permit him, that for the Friendship of one, he would enter into a War with another; but that he was resolved always to carry an even hand betwixt them both."¹ He could thus avoid both Spanish and Dutch pressures on himself by showing his intention of remaining at peace with all. It was a fact that James wished to remain neutral in his relations with Spain and the United Provinces, but it seemed plausible to effect this goal by emphasizing his inherent pacifist inclinations. There were several other examples of this wish being emphasized in following years. In July, 1604, it was reported from Antwerp that the English had answered Spain's request for an offensive and defensive alliance by declaring that they had no intention of breaking the peace in any direction.² Again, in July, 1605, Charles Cornwallis, English ambassador in Spain, replied to Spanish complaints that the English were allowing depredations to be carried out in English waters, by asserting that his master could only try to ease the situation in a peaceful way as he hoped to live in peace with everyone.³ This manoeuvring

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1. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 7 (Cecil to Winwood).
 2. Victor von Klarwill (ed.), The Fugger News-Letters, (London, 1926), p. 340.
 3. Winwood Memorials, II, p. 104 (Cornwallis to the Privy Council).

continued during much of James's reign, although it seems to have gone out of control after Cecil's death.

James's stance was genuine but it could be employed deceptively in serious diplomatic situations, and many of his own subjects became convinced that their monarch was only interested in keeping peace at any price. They were frustrated by their king's lack of strong action on the international scene and began to question James's peace-making efforts. There were indications that James's pacific outlook was the most unpopular feature of the early years of his reign.¹ Many Englishmen wished that James would give more assistance to the German Protestants and even become their champion. But by 1610 it appeared that they had given up hope that he would support the Protestant cause actively. Some felt that "...we for our Parts, are fitter to skirmish with the Pen than with the Sword, and readyer to uphold our side with Words and Wishes, than with Arms or other real Assistance."² Thus the epithet "peacemaker" gradually was transformed from a compliment into a stigma.

But even though peace was foremost in James's mind he

1. Spedding, The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon, IV, p. 16.

2. Winwood Memorials, III, p. 154 (Chamberlain to Winwood).



acted with strength when the occasion demanded, and there were several instances during the early years of his reign when he showed that he was capable of making decisions in England's interest which were not very peaceful in appearance. In 1606, when Venice was on the verge of war with Rome, James threw his weight onto the Venetian side and offered Venice support if it was needed.¹ Another such instance came when the Dutch suddenly accepted a truce with Spain and the Archdukes in April, 1607. This was a dilemma to James for he personally favoured peace, but his position as King of England forced him to consider the consequences of the peace. He feared the dominance of the French in the United Provinces and thus had to act accordingly. James's actions through the truce talks showed that even though he personally desired peace, he was not devoid of the more elemental instinct, that toward self-preservation.

Again he showed a vigorous course of action in the crisis over the Duchy of Cleves. Both the Catholic and Protestant sides in this dispute tried to draw James to their side. James came out on the side of the Protestants

1. Smith, Sir Henry Wotton, I, p. 361.



and promised the services of 4,000 troops, but ambassador Correr reported in the spring of 1610 that the English were proceeding slowly in their promised aid to the German Protestants.¹ In this same letter, Correr suggested that the English had hoped that the mere rumour of a Protestant combination would be sufficient to induce the Archduke Leopold to leave the possession of the Duchy free to the Protestant claimants. This was possibly the principal reason for the English hesitancy, and with the failure of the Great Contract in 1610, James was handicapped by serious financial problems and therefore could not act vigorously in foreign affairs.

There was much that was sensible in the opening years of James's reign and peace prevailed. At times the king acted strongly and showed himself prepared to use armed force as an instrument of diplomacy, but the fact remains that a wish for peace was consistent in early Jacobean foreign policy. According to Garrett Mattingly, James brought England nothing: "Nothing, that is, except almost twenty years of the peace he sought."²

1. Cal. S. P. Venetian, XI, p. 471 (Correr to Doge and Senate).

2. Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (London, 1962), p. 207.



One of the most important considerations to examine for an understanding of early Jacobean foreign policy is the complicated problem of finance. Once James came to realize the weak state of his financial position in England, he was hindered in most things he attempted. "It is a commonplace that the Tudors and early Stuarts had to administer a modern State with medieval methods of finance..."¹ A closer look at the financial problems of James's reign will help to explain why he acted as he did in so many instances with regard to foreign affairs.

Included in Elizabeth's legacy to James was the almost unsolvable problem of Crown financial decay. At first, James was not aware of this problem as he believed he had entered the land of milk and honey. But several financial problems existed in 1603 and although they were alleviated with the coming of peace, a final solution was not found. With the end of the war, expenditures on military and naval establishments, with the notable exception of the cautionary towns, were greatly reduced. Other factors like the disappearance of the need to garrison Berwick, also lowered the level of expenditure from Elizabethan times.²

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1. Robert Ashton, The Crown and the Money Market, 1603-1640, (Oxford, 1960), p. 15.
 2. Dietz, English Public Finance, pp. 108-109.



But even though these savings were made, other expenditures developed which more than offset them. To begin with, Elizabeth had left a large debt and coupled with this was the enormous increase in household expenditures as James's extravagances went unchecked. A more complicated reason for the growth of Crown expenditure was the increased charges of government functions at a time when the standard of living was on the increase.¹ While the nation at large was finding further avenues of profit-making, the Crown was faced with the decay of old revenues and few prospects for the creation of any new ones. Neither James nor his successors received much understanding for their financial problems from their subjects, who still believed in the old adage that the king must live of his own. They certainly could not understand why James needed more money after peace was made than Elizabeth needed during war. This, coupled with the lack of an efficient exchequer system, produced the ever-worsening tangle of James's finances.

But what is of main concern here is the effect of these financial problems on foreign affairs. A few bright

1. Dietz, English Public Finance, p.. 110.



spots did exist for English finance on the international scene in large debts owed to the English Crown by foreign countries. The most obvious case was the money owed by the Dutch, and with the realization of the Twelve Years' Truce, James hoped to be able to collect the large amount of money they owed the English Crown. In 1609, the Dutch acknowledged a debt of £818,408.¹ This figure must have seemed massive to James, who, by this time, was beginning to search for a supplement to his increasingly inadequate income. His financial straits were duly noted by Noel de Caron, who wrote to Oldenbarnevelt on December 22, 1609, that James was becoming more insistent on the question of the debt, and had asked whether it was possible to receive some advance from the States-General.² Caron was sympathetic concerning James's need, but as a matter of course he had to plead the plight of the Dutch and attempted to delay the whole question.³ James was particularly insistent for some payment after the failure of the Great Contract in 1610, and between September, 1611 and March, 1616 the sum of

1. Dietz, English Public Finance, p. 457.

2. Veenendaal, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, p. 393 (Caron to Oldenbarnevelt).

3. Ibid., p. 394 (Caron to Oldenbarnevelt).



£200,000 was paid by the Dutch.¹ The importance of finance in the years after 1609 is seen by the fact that James's financial needs were the constant subject in Caron's correspondence with Oldenbarnevelt. But the Dutch were in no hurry to pay their debt as they found that their debt was an asset rather than a liability in relations with England. The English were thus placed in an awkward position.

At first glance, the cautionary towns appeared to be an English asset but upon closer examination were a great expense. England had been in possession of Brill, Flushing and the fort of Rammekens since 1585, as security for English loans to the Dutch. The importance of these towns was obvious since Flushing controlled the entrance to the Scheldt river, and therefore the entrance to Antwerp, while Brill was situated near the entrance of the Maas. The blessing of the importance of these towns to the English was more apparent than real for James found that he had to pay about £25,000 a year to maintain 1,150 men in the towns.² As James became more aware of his growing financial weakness, he saw the towns merely as one of the

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1. Dietz, English Public Finance, pp. 449-458 has a comprehensive discussion of this subject, including many of the facts and figures here cited.
 2. Ibid., p. 456.



many drains on his resources. At the beginning, the cautionary towns seemed to benefit the English but ultimately they were to prove a headache to James. The problem was finally ended in 1616 when the towns were returned to the Dutch but of the £618,000 that was owed, only about £210,000 was received.¹ Here is an obvious example of James's financial embarrassments, and how they were exploited by the Dutch.

Henry IV also had been the recipient of large amounts of English money during Elizabeth's reign, and James had hopes of seeing this repaid. The money in question was the £335,000 still owed by the French to the English Crown.² The Hampton Court Treaty reduced the debt by £90,000 in consideration of the payment of that sum by France to the United Provinces. In 1603 Henry IV managed only one payment of £14,322.³ While the English king tried his best to get France to honour her obligation, he received little satisfaction even after Henry's death. The only other payments James received were in 1612 and 1613, when a total of £60,000 was turned over to him.⁴

1. Dietz, English Public Finance, p. 457.

2. Ibid., p. 459.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.



Henceforth James could do little but try to remain on good terms with France in the hope that the debt would eventually be repaid. But it was generally ignored and James had to look elsewhere to solve his financial needs. He did not have to look far because the Spanish were always ready to open their purse and to tempt James with the wealth of the Americas.

For a long time the Spanish had been trying to draw James into some sort of alliance and one of the inducements was a proposed marriage between Prince Henry and the Infanta, with a handsome dowry as part of the bargain. But while James's financial problems were not at the critical stage, and while Cecil was still alive, Spanish hints produced little effect. Nevertheless it was something that the king was aware of, and as his financial position worsened in the second decade of the seventeenth century, he was more responsive to Spanish advances. His financial needs, coupled with a desire to make friends with both Catholics and Protestants, plus the influence of Gondomar,¹ resulted in a positive move towards a Spanish marriage.

The prospect of a large dowry also was of prime importance to James in weighing other marriage-alliance

1. Diego Sarmiento de Acuna arrived in London as Spanish ambassador in 1613. He became Count Gondomar in 1618.



proposals. In 1611 and 1612, negotiations were conducted for marriage alliances between England and Savoy, and England and Tuscany but neither amounted to much. A marriage was arranged in 1612 when Princess Elizabeth was betrothed to the Elector Palatine. Some, especially Queen Anne, were against this marriage because they felt the Princess would be marrying below her station, but the majority of Englishmen were overjoyed at this alliance with a Protestant German. James himself was pleased because the Elector did not demand a large dowry, but James had to provide for the enormous cost of the wedding.¹

James's financial straits were recognized by many of his subjects who used this to gain his ear with money making schemes. For example, there was the treatise by Tobias Gentleman which showed that great sums of money were taken from "His Majesty's seas" by strangers.² But any attempt by James to try to compete with the Dutch in their fishing industry was bound to bring conflict between them, and in fact did. Other projects for increasing Crown revenues were proposed, for example, by

1. Dietz, English Public Finance, p. 156.

2. Gentleman, An English Garner, p. 250.



Alderman Cockayne who devised a scheme for the textile industry whereby his company received a charter from James with the promise of financial reward.¹ The project failed miserably, and one reason for this was Dutch opposition which closed the main markets for Cockayne's exports. Here again was evidence of Dutch obstruction to English projects aimed at increasing Crown funds. Any other venture abroad enticed James if it offered the prospect of financial reward and he tried everything from searching for gold in Scotland to gambling Sir Walter Raleigh's life for gold in Guiana.

The House of Commons also realized James's financial problems and used them to bargain with the Crown. Since the Crown needed an increased revenue, the Commons demanded settlement of grievances and increased powers before it would discuss finances. In other words, the Commons found the way in which they might try to coerce James to do its will. James learned that his revenues could not be increased at home unless he was prepared to negotiate with Parliament. But his basic political philosophy did not

1. R. H. Tawney, Business and Politics under James I, (New York, 1958), pp. 126-27 discusses Cockayne's project.



leave room for an appreciation of the English form of government. He had set down his political theory in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies published in 1598, where he mapped out the position and duties of a king as set forth in the Scriptures, and asserted the absolute power of kings. It was to be expected that this belief would impair his understanding of the English scene. "In James's theory there is no more place for the supremacy or even the independence of the national assembly than for its decrees."¹ Therefore, he had to look abroad for a supplement to his purse because Parliament would not grant money unless grievances were dealt with.

The government could not hope to disguise financial weaknesses for long, and when Parliament realized its own strength, trouble resulted. According to Spedding: "the best chance of averting or postponing the discovery would be to engage the country in some action which would carry the sympathies of the people with it."² Here is the old political device of calling for a bold foreign adventure to divert domestic unrest. The fact was that the Spanish peace had allowed the English "...to thrive and quarrel among themselves in full security."³ Bacon, if he had

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1. C. H. McIlwain (ed.), The Political Works of James I, (Cambridge, Mass., 1918), p. xli.
 2. Spedding, The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon, IV, p. 16.
 3. G. N. Clark, Early Modern Europe, (New York, 1960). p. 136.



been asked, almost certainly would have pressed for a bolder foreign policy as a solution to the tension of financial difficulty.¹ The example of excited English loyalty to the Crown at the time that the Spanish Armada approached was used to support this. But this argument only offered a delay to the basic question at hand, and solution to the financial problem would be postponed and not solved. Furthermore, when James attempted a strong foreign policy during the Cleves-Jülich dispute of 1609, the government did not witness an outburst of loyalty.² Cecil tried to gain more subsidies from Parliament, but failed. Nevertheless a bolder foreign policy was not attractive to "the peace-maker". A vigorous foreign policy might have postponed the issue but also would have increased Crown needs and, therefore, dependence on Parliament.

Although Cecil, as Lord Treasurer, made a concerted effort to improve the Crown's financial situation his greatest scheme, the Great Contract, failed. Cecil was one of the few who realized the many problems facing James, and supported the king in his desire for peace. But with the death of the Lord Treasurer in 1612, James lost a

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1. Spedding, The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon, IV, p. 17
 2. The Gunpowder Plot did cause Parliament to ease the purse strings in 1606. However, the money granted took time to collect and the Crown needed immediate funds. Dietz, English Public Finance, p. 121.



great steadying force and he was soon to fall under the influence of a foreigner whose sole purpose was to advance the Spanish cause. The failure of James to find enough money at home made him susceptible to such influence and thus, "The age of Salisbury ends: that of Gondomar begins."¹

Crown finances played a significant role in the formation of early Jacobean foreign policy for they often governed England's relations with the United Provinces, France, and Spain. And since Parliament refused to grant James the money he needed, he had to look abroad. From then on, the presence of such considerations as the Spanish marriage, with its monetary rewards, attracted James to a greater degree. In fact the king's wish to live in peace was further justified by these financial difficulties.

1. Hurstfield, "Robert Cecil", p. 286.



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

When he ascended the English throne, James was faced with a maze in foreign affairs and only by understanding this maze was he able to decide upon a course of action. The matter was not entirely simple, however, for although James found several paths open to him, all had both advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, James sought a path of his own design, a path which proved adequate for the early years of his reign.

In retrospect it can be said that there were four routes open to Jacobean foreign policy. Initially mighty Spain had to be considered and although peace appeared to be an obvious first step, the future relations of the two were not so apparent. Spain was still the strongest occidental power, and to become Spain's enemy James had but to promise support to Spain's avowed enemies, the United Provinces. But there would be a price to pay for such a policy in that several important European areas would henceforward not be safe for James's subjects, and his own domains would be threatened by the still-strong Spanish navy. As James hoped to enjoy his new position as



king of a rich domain he wanted no part of such a policy and he desired peace and amiable relations with Spain.

But the anti-Spanish bias of English public opinion was an obstacle, and this was combined with Anglo-Spanish commercial rivalry. Furthermore, James was aware that any policy which leaned toward friendship with Spain would alienate the United Provinces and France and thus would compromise several English commercial interests. The old English fear of French domination in the Netherlands warned James against this policy. It must have been apparent to James, under Cecil's guidance, that the possibility of a policy of Anglo-Spanish friendship was fraught with risk. Therefore this first route was impractical, at least in the context of early conditions.

Another possible avenue for Jacobean foreign policy was a pro-French and anti-Habsburg one. This would have brought England into alliance with France, whose position was improving with the end of her domestic wars and the resulting stability under Henry IV. Many regarded this as an obvious course because of past English alliances with France against Spain and because James, as King of Scotland, had had a tradition of favourable relations with France. A more fundamental reason for a pro-French policy was the



debt France had contracted with England and which James hoped to collect.

However, this policy could not be effected without great caution as France was but a recent English ally. For several centuries France had been England's foremost rival and if this rivalry re-appeared it would present a great threat to English security due to the geographic proximity of France. This was illustrated by English wariness of French actions during the Dutch peace negotiations with Spain and the Archdukes. At the same time James had to be cautious of becoming too closely entangled with the militant Henry IV, for it appeared that France was not above trying to improve her relations with Spain while encouraging others to an anti-Spanish policy.

A third course for Jacobean policy could have made England champion of the Protestant cause. England had had close ties with the Dutch and with some German Protestant states during her struggle with Spain, and was regarded as the leading Protestant state. All this, coupled with the possibility of French support, could produce in theory an alliance of strength. But their religious unity was not enough to join the Protestant



states solidly, and any offensive alliance offered by these states was wisely avoided by James. Moreover, any real effort toward a European Protestant alliance would incur the enmity of Spain.

In actuality the policy which James followed grew ad hoc in light of all the above possibilities. For the reason that a policy favourable to any one state or states would bring the rancour of others, a policy of neutrality seemed the wisest choice. Out of self-defence, a policy of peace for all would result in the alienation of none. Although there is no proof that these four paths were evident to James, they readily suggest themselves as possibilities open to him during his early years on the English throne. England's past relations in Europe had to be taken into account, but could not be used as the sole guide because the European scene was undergoing constant change. The fourth path was a new departure which resulted from the combination of James's and England's needs.

It seemed that unless James wanted to enter openly into an offensive alliance and keep prepared for war, he would be forced to follow the difficult policy of remaining aloof from the problems of others. During the early years



of English Jacobean rule a policy of neutrality was feasible because after the cease fire in the Netherlands in 1607, western Europe was at peace. The antagonists of the past, the United Provinces, France, and Spain were preoccupied with the build-up of their internal strength and under this circumstance James could practice a peace policy with moderate success. But the old rivalries were only napping, and when they reawakened on the eve of the Thirty Years' War, James was unprepared to adapt. He always sought a peaceful course and when the international scene became too complicated for him and he did not have guidance from a Sir Robert Cecil, he was unable to understand it.

James has been much criticized for the weak uncertainties which beset his reign, especially in the latter part. But stability characterized early Jacobean foreign affairs and the Scotsman managed to lead, under Cecil's direction, a consistent foreign policy which combined his own personal desires with basic English interests abroad. This balance disappeared during the second half of his reign when these two factors became incompatible. However, this does not concern this thesis. In the early Jacobean context, the foreign policy of James I was based primarily on a calculated policy of peace and in this it was successful.



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